Taiwan: How Russia is learning from China in the gray zone | DW News

Key Concepts

• Gray Zone Harassment: Prolonged, low-intensity actions designed to wear down capabilities, test vulnerabilities, and discredit the government.
• Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ): A designated airspace within which a country requires the ready identification, location, and control of aircraft.
• First Island Chain: A series of islands that run from the Kuril Islands in the north, through Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo, to the Malay Peninsula in the south, forming a strategic barrier.
• Silicon Shield: The idea that Taiwan's dominance in semiconductor manufacturing provides it with a degree of protection against military action, as any disruption would have severe global economic consequences.
• Whole-of-Society Resilience: A comprehensive approach to national defense that involves strengthening all aspects of society, including military, economic, social, and psychological resilience.
• Asymmetric Capabilities: Military capabilities that allow a weaker force to effectively counter a stronger adversary, often involving innovative tactics and technologies.
• AI Supremacy: Dominance in the field of Artificial Intelligence, including research, development, and application.
• Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Proclamation: Historical documents cited by China to support its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.
• UN Resolution 2758: A United Nations resolution recognizing the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate representative of China at the UN.

Russian and Chinese Incursions: A Comparison

• Russian Incursions into NATO Airspace: The Warsaw Security Forum has focused on recent Russian drone and fighter jet incursions into NATO airspace.
• Taiwan's Experience with Chinese Incursions: Taiwan reported 3,600 incursions by Chinese military aircraft into its ADIZ in 2024 alone, averaging about 10 per day.
• Hsu Szu-Chien's Warning: Hsu Szu-Chien, a top national security advisor to Taiwan's president, warns that these incursions are not coincidental and that the Eastern European and East Asian theaters are connected.
• Difference in Severity: While both involve incursions, Russian drones entering other countries' territories are considered more serious than Chinese incursions into Taiwan's ADIZ, which remain outside Taiwan's territorial waters (12 nautical miles).
• Potential Motivations for Incursions:
  • Depletion of Capabilities: Wearing out the opponent's resources and testing their response time.
  • Vulnerability Testing: Identifying weaknesses in the opponent's defenses.
  • Information Manipulation: Discrediting the government and creating domestic issues.
  • Familiarization: Gaining familiarity with the air, ground, and sea environment for potential future conflict.
  • Transition to Blitzkrieg: The possibility of escalating from gray zone harassment to a full-scale attack.

Lessons from Taiwan's Experience

• Firmness from the Beginning: The key is to be firm and establish credibility from the outset.
• "New Normal" Strategy: China establishes a pattern of incursions, gradually normalizing them.
• Dangers of Numbness: Becoming desensitized to frequent incursions can make a country vulnerable to a sudden attack.

Connection Between Eastern Europe and East Asia

• Direct Connection: Hsu argues that the situations in Eastern Europe and East Asia are directly connected due to cooperation between Russia and China.
• Mutual Assistance:
  • China's Support for Russia: Providing machinery, tools, chips, and manufacturing capabilities to bolster Russia's defense industries.
  • Russia's Support for China: Joint patrols in Northeast Asia and near Taiwan, strengthening China's airborne battalion with aircraft and equipment.
• Strategic Necessity: China needs Russia to avoid isolation and to intimidate the world.
• Diversion of Attention: The conflicts in Europe and Asia divert attention and resources, potentially isolating countries.
• Potential Contingency: In the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, Russia could keep Europe occupied.

European Attention and Support

• Concern about Insufficient Attention: There's concern that Europe and the wider West are not paying enough attention to the Taiwan Strait situation.
• Message to Europeans: Europe should help Taiwan, as this is mutually beneficial and counters the China-Russia alliance.
• Areas of Support:
  • Refuting China's Narrative: Countering China's mischaracterization of international law and norms.
  • Strategic Understanding: Recognizing the strategic importance of Taiwan.
  • Capability Building: Supporting Taiwan in developing its defense capabilities.
  • Supply Chain Cooperation: Integrating supply chains to enhance mutual capabilities.
• Taiwan's Strengths: Taiwan possesses the best and most reliable microelectronics manufacturing capabilities, free from Chinese components.
• Drone Exports to Poland: Taiwan exports a significant number of drones to Poland and seeks to expand this business through co-production and joint ventures.
• Need for Defensive Items: Taiwan welcomes defensive items, especially asymmetric capabilities like Stingers, from European countries.
• Risk of Inaction: European countries are taking a greater risk by not investing in peace and deterring war, as waiting until a conflict erupts will be too late and more costly.

US-Taiwan Relations and Semiconductor Production

• US Desire for Domestic Chip Production: The US aims to increase domestic chip production to 50% and seeks Taiwan's help.
• Taiwan's Outbound Investment to the US: Taiwan's outbound investment to the US has surpassed that to China, driven by market demand and the potential of the AI-driven economy.
• Feasibility of 50/50 Production: Achieving a 50/50 production split requires a sustainable roadmap and the formation of a complete ecosystem and supply chain.
• Common Interest in AI Supremacy: Taiwan and the US share a common interest in building AI supremacy.
• Silicon Shield Misconception: The "silicon shield" is not an official policy, but Taiwan and the US share interests in both security and economic development.
• AIT's View on Taiwan's Status: The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) confirmed its view that the status of Taiwan is "undetermined," which counters China's narrative based on historical documents.
• China's Narrative as Preparation for Invasion: China's narrative aims to establish a new norm that Taiwan is part of China, justifying potential intervention.

Preparing for Contingencies

• Civil Defense Handbook: The Taiwanese government regularly updates its civil defense handbook to prepare the public for potential conflict.
• Whole-of-Society Resilience: Building resilience across all aspects of society, including telecommunications, energy, and critical infrastructure.
• Importance of Public Confidence: Empowering citizens with knowledge and skills to protect themselves strengthens resilience and prevents panic.
• Peace Through Strength: Peace needs to be earned through strength, encompassing both military and societal resilience.

Conclusion

Despite ongoing concerns, Hsu Szu-Chien remains optimistic, drawing inspiration from the unity and support for Ukraine witnessed at the Warsaw Security Forum. He emphasizes the interconnectedness of the European and Asian theaters, urging Europe to recognize the mutual benefits of supporting Taiwan and countering the coordinated efforts of China and Russia. He stresses the importance of investing in peace and deterrence now, rather than waiting for a conflict to erupt.