Optus' communication breakdown | Insiders On Background

Key Concepts

• Triple0 Network/Ecosystem: The complex system involving multiple telecommunications networks (Telstra, Optus, TPG, Vodafone), mobile devices (Apple, Samsung, Google), and emergency services operators that facilitates emergency calls.
• Optus Outage (Last Month): A 13-hour network failure impacting over 600 triple0 calls and resulting in three deaths, attributed by Optus to a routine firewall upgrade.
• "Camp On": A standard mobile device feature where, if a phone cannot connect to its home network, it scans for and attempts to connect to any other available network to make a call. This process can take 15-30 seconds.
• ACMA (Australian Communications and Media Authority): The primary regulator for telecommunications in Australia, responsible for enforcing compliance and imposing penalties.
• Enhancing Consumer Safeguards Bill: Proposed legislation currently before Parliament designed to grant ACMA stronger enforcement powers and the ability to impose significantly larger fines on telcos.
• Bean Review: An investigation conducted by former ACMA Deputy Chair Richard Bean following the 2023 Optus outage, which produced 18 recommendations, including the establishment of a Triple0 Custodian.
• Triple0 Custodian: A new role, established within the Department of Communications, designed to provide an end-to-end overview of the triple0 ecosystem and, with new legislation, possess legal powers to compel information sharing from telcos.
• Temporary Disaster Roaming: A proposed system allowing users in disaster-affected areas to automatically roam onto any available network, even if it's not their home network. This is technically complex and carries risks.
• "Fog of War": A term used to describe the chaotic and information-scarce environment during a major network outage, making it difficult to ascertain precise details immediately.

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The Recent Optus Outage: Details and Initial Analysis

The discussion begins by highlighting the critical nature of the triple0 network, often taken for granted until the recent Optus outage. This major incident, lasting approximately 13 hours, resulted in more than 600 triple0 calls failing to connect and tragically, three reported deaths.

Luke Coleman, CEO of the Australian Telecommunications Alliance, explains that while two investigations are underway (by ACMA and an independent Kerry Shot investigation), Optus has publicly stated the outage was caused by a "relatively routine network upgrade" to install a new firewall – a cybersecurity upgrade. This upgrade appears to have inadvertently cut off access to the triple0 system, even though the regular phone network remained operational. This unusual circumstance meant no immediate alarms were triggered within Optus, as the network seemed to be functioning normally for non-emergency calls.

Regarding the delay in realizing the severity of the outage, Coleman notes that emergency call volumes fluctuate significantly, making it not immediately apparent that a drop in calls indicated a widespread triple0 issue rather than individual device problems.

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The Triple0 Ecosystem and "Camp On" Functionality

The triple0 system is described as a complex "ecosystem" involving multiple networks (Telstra, Optus, TPG, Vodafone), various mobile devices (Apple, Samsung, Google), and emergency services operators. Each component has different regulatory obligations.

A key technical concept discussed is "camp on," a standard feature in mobile devices. If a device with an Optus SIM, for example, cannot connect to its home Optus network, it should automatically scan for and attempt to connect to any other available network (e.g., Telstra) to make a call. However, this process is not instantaneous, taking 15 to 30 seconds, and different handsets can behave differently during an outage. The transcript notes that this issue may have occurred again, similar to the 2023 Optus outage, though investigations are ongoing. The question remains whether the failure to "camp on" was an Optus network problem or a device-related issue, or if the partial functionality of the Optus network prevented devices from seeking alternative networks.

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Regulatory Landscape and Communication Failures

Optus faced significant criticism for providing incorrect and delayed information to authorities. Initially, an email sent to the Department of Communications (to the wrong address) stated only 10 calls were impacted, a figure later revealed to be over 600. Coleman attributes this initial miscommunication to the "fog of war" during an outage, where perfect information is unavailable, and telcos provide the best information they have at the time, which evolves as more data becomes available.

The discussion clarifies the regulatory obligations:

• Existing Obligations: Telcos have obligations to communicate with customers during network outages, depending on scale and duration. ACMA has the authority to enforce these rules, as demonstrated by a fine issued to Optus after the 2023 outage.
• New Obligations (Effective November 1st): New rules are coming into force that will impose additional obligations on carriers to communicate with a wider range of regulators, including ACMA and the TIO (Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman). This suggests that while some existing obligations were in place, the specific requirements for communicating with government bodies during a triple0 outage are being strengthened.

The government's anger at Optus is noted, particularly concerning the delayed and incorrect information. Coleman, however, suggests that Optus may not have had an existing obligation to provide real-time information to the department in the exact manner the government expected, emphasizing the new rules coming into effect.

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ACMA's Enforcement Powers and Optus CEO's Position

The transcript highlights that a bill, the Enhancing Consumer Safeguards Bill, is currently before Parliament. This legislation, conceived before the recent outage, aims to give ACMA "much stronger enforcement powers and the ability to impose much larger fines" on telcos for non-compliance. This indicates a pre-existing recognition of the need for greater regulatory heft.

Regarding Optus CEO Steven Rue, Coleman strongly defends his position, stating Rue is the "right guy to be running Optus" and should remain in his role. He argues that Rue has been in the role for less than a year, making it unreasonable to expect him to completely transform a company of Optus's size in such a short period. Coleman also praises Rue's transparency, noting his prompt media appearances within 24 hours of the outage, explaining the situation with the information available at the time.

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The Role of the Triple0 Custodian

The government has introduced legislation to establish the Triple0 Custodian, a key recommendation from the Bean Review (conducted after the 2023 Optus outage). The Bean Review identified fragmented regulatory obligations across the triple0 ecosystem.

The Custodian's purpose is to provide an "end-to-end overview" of the entire triple0 ecosystem. While the function was established in the Department of Communications in March, the new legislation will grant it "legal teeth," allowing it to compel telcos to share information. Currently, the department lacks the legal authority of a regulator to demand sensitive operational data, which telcos might withhold due to commercial sensitivity or legal concerns. The Custodian's new powers would address this, ensuring that critical information about network operations, upgrades, and testing can be legally obtained during or after an incident. The exact scope of its power to direct telcos to take specific actions (e.g., halt an upgrade) will depend on the final legislation.

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Challenges of Temporary Disaster Roaming

Another recommendation from the Bean Review was for telcos to provide temporary disaster roaming during natural disasters. This has not yet been implemented due to its "extremely technically complex" nature.

Coleman explains the significant risks:

• Network Overwhelm: If a disaster takes out one network's tower (e.g., Telstra) and thousands of users suddenly attempt to roam onto a competitor's network (e.g., Optus), that network could become overwhelmed.
• Cascading Impact: This influx of users could lead to a "domino effect," potentially bringing down the second network as well, resulting in a wider outage instead of just one.
• Cost Implications: Telcos configure their networks for expected usage. Building in enough additional capacity to handle all competitors' customers during a disaster would be significantly more expensive, potentially leading to higher costs for consumers.

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Future Outlook and Industry Commitment

Coleman acknowledges that network outages occur daily, usually on a small, localized scale and are fixed quickly. Not every network outage is a triple0 outage, as there are "layers of protection" and alternative networks (e.g., Wi-Fi calling via NBN). He emphasizes that "there is no bulletproof network that is always going to be up 100% of the time."

However, the industry is "absolutely united" in its commitment to making the triple0 system as robust and trusted as possible. The ongoing investigations and the establishment of the Triple0 Custodian are seen as crucial steps to identify flaws and implement new protections. The industry pledges to work together to enhance the reliability of emergency services for Australians.

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Conclusion

The Optus outage exposed critical vulnerabilities and complexities within Australia's triple0 ecosystem, prompting significant government and industry response. While the immediate cause was attributed to a firewall upgrade, the incident highlighted challenges in device "camp on" functionality, the "fog of war" in crisis communication, and the need for clearer regulatory obligations. The government's introduction of the Enhancing Consumer Safeguards Bill and the establishment of the Triple0 Custodian aim to strengthen ACMA's enforcement powers and provide an end-to-end oversight of the emergency call network. However, complex solutions like temporary disaster roaming face significant technical and financial hurdles. Ultimately, the incident serves as a stark reminder that while a "bulletproof" network is unattainable, continuous investment, robust regulation, and industry collaboration are essential to ensure the triple0 system remains as reliable as possible for Australians in emergencies.