LIVE: UN nuclear watchdog chief Rafael Grossi holds a press conference

Key Concepts

• IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency): The international organization responsible for promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
• NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty): An international treaty aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and furthering the goal of nuclear disarmament.
• Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA): Agreements between the IAEA and member states that provide the legal framework for the IAEA to verify that nuclear material is not diverted for military purposes.
• Subsidiary Arrangements: Documents that supplement safeguards agreements, detailing specific procedures and arrangements for implementing safeguards.
• Board of Governors: The executive body of the IAEA, responsible for overseeing the Agency's work and approving its budget.
• Fuel Cycle: The series of steps involved in the production of nuclear energy, from mining uranium to disposing of spent fuel.
• Proliferation: The spread of nuclear weapons, fissile material, and related technology to countries that do not possess them.
• JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action): The Iran nuclear deal, an agreement on a program intended to curb Iran's nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.
• Snapback: A provision in the JCPOA that allows for the re-imposition of sanctions if Iran violates its commitments.
• Small Quantities Protocol: A provision within safeguards agreements that allows states with minimal nuclear material to have a simplified safeguards regime.

IAEA's Role and Mandate

The speaker, the Director General (DG) of the IAEA, emphasizes that the Agency's actions are dictated by resolutions passed by its Board of Governors, not by individual statements or opinions. He clarifies that the IAEA does not draft resolutions; member states do, and the Agency then implements them technically. This distinction is crucial to counter the misconception that the IAEA's actions are based on personal preferences or external influence, particularly in relation to Iran.

Cooperation with Iran and Verification Challenges

The DG reiterates the importance of focusing on the established framework for cooperation with Iran, which includes the NPT, Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, and subsidiary arrangements. He acknowledges that the current situation is challenging, with ongoing difficulties in achieving full access for inspections. Specifically, the DG highlights the inability to access "attack sites" in Iran, which is a critical part of Iran's commitments under the NPT.

• Key Point: Iran's commitment to the NPT necessitates adherence to its obligations, including allowing inspections at all relevant facilities.
• Specific Detail: The DG stated, "we have started we have performed a number of inspections, but we have not been able to go to the attack sites yet."
• Argument: Remaining in the NPT is a constructive and wise decision for Iran, but it comes with obligations that are not being met in proportion to what is expected.
• Technical Term: Enriched uranium stockpile: The DG believes, and it is confirmed by the Iranian government, that the stockpile of enriched uranium still exists, and verification of this is a primary focus of ongoing conversations.

Addressing the Question of "What's New?"

When questioned about new approaches to gain access and trust in Iran, the DG states that his primary tool is dialogue with Iran. He acknowledges that bilateral conversations between Iran and the United States might be helpful but emphasizes that the core issue is between Iran and the IAEA. He refutes the notion that past efforts have "not worked," framing the current situation as part of an ongoing dialogue, albeit one complicated by recent events like the use of force, destruction, and victims.

• Key Argument: The situation is complex, involving political and sociological factors that need to be addressed alongside technical verification.
• Statement: "I cannot expect me you know me mechanistically that everything will be fine just because there is I understand that. So there is a a a political a sociological situation there that needs to be addressed."

US-Saudi Arabia Technology Sharing Agreement

The DG addresses a question regarding a new technology-sharing agreement between the US and Saudi Arabia.

• Key Point: The agreement's announcement mentions adherence to safeguards obligations, which is a positive sign.
• Technical Term: Fuel cycle activities: The DG notes that the agreement appears general but likely includes fuel cycle activities, necessitating IAEA verification capabilities.
• Fact: The DG was not notified about the agreement and cannot confirm the existence of a "one, two, three agreement" (a type of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement).
• IAEA's Role: The IAEA will review the agreement to ensure its safeguards dimension is crucial and that they have the ability to verify any fuel cycle activities.

Iran Resolution and IAEA's Neutrality

The DG discusses the potential impact of a resolution on Iran.

• Key Point: The IAEA expects cooperation to continue and does not believe a resolution should logically lead to less cooperation.
• Argument: Cooperative engagement is necessary for the implementation of obligations.
• Challenge: There remains a gap in verification, with things the IAEA needs to see and inspect that have not yet been accessible.
• Impact of JCPOA: The snapback of sanctions and the absence of JCPOA's main verification activities create a new situation.
• IAEA's Stance: The DG emphasizes that he must remain neutral and implement what the Board of Governors requests. Even without a resolution, he will continue to push for necessary inspections.
• Process: Any inspection implementation is done in consultation with the country, and Iran's new law requiring notifications to the Supreme National Security Council will be considered.

Concerns about Nuclear Facilities and Attacks

The DG addresses concerns about a new type of high explosion containment vessel and past attacks on nuclear facilities.

• Containment Vessel: The DG states that recent activities related to a high explosion containment vessel are not directly related to the IAEA's inspection regime and do not currently point to activities that should fall under their purview.
• Attacks on Facilities: The DG refutes the Iranian claim that all nuclear facilities have been destroyed and there is nothing left to inspect.
  • Specific Detail: Some facilities in Natanz were severely damaged, while others were not. Similar situations exist in Esfahan.
  • Consensus: There is a widespread consensus that material is still present, and access may still be possible.
  • Verification Principle: If a country claims destruction, the IAEA must verify this first, rather than accepting the claim at face value. This is how comprehensive safeguards agreements function.
• Precedent for Attacks: The DG clarifies that while there have been attacks on nuclear facilities, the IAEA does not need to develop entirely new protocols for inspections in such cases.
  • Technical Point: The primary concern in such situations might be contamination, which is often limited and manageable with protective equipment.
  • Methodology: The IAEA knows how to handle potential material spread and conduct necessary sampling.

Information Sharing and Trust

The DG directly addresses the Iranian assertion that Israel obtained information through the IAEA.

• Key Argument: The DG unequivocally denies passing information to anyone, stating, "We do not pass information to anybody."
• Evidence: He asserts there is no proof of such information sharing, and the IAEA has never done so.
• Counter-Argument: The idea that an installation is attacked because of information is dismissed, as the facilities and their work are well-known.
• Trust: The DG acknowledges that this is a matter of trust and that while he respects the comments made, he disagrees with the premise. He notes that this specific issue does not frequently arise in his direct conversations with the Iranian government, suggesting it might be more of a political statement.

Arrest of Iranian Staff Member

The DG addresses the case of an Iranian staff member arrested in Iran.

• Distinction: He clearly separates this issue from Iran's nuclear program and verification activities.
• Nature of Case: It is a penal situation involving a staff member, which has been handled through legal channels.
• IAEA's Involvement: The IAEA cares for the family and is looking into the matter through appropriate channels, but it has "nothing to do with our verification activities in Iran."

Conclusion and Synthesis

The DG of the IAEA emphasizes the Agency's commitment to its mandate of verifying peaceful nuclear activities and preventing proliferation. He stresses that the IAEA operates based on resolutions from its Board of Governors and international agreements like the NPT and Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. While acknowledging the complex and challenging geopolitical environment, particularly concerning Iran, the DG reiterates the importance of dialogue, adherence to obligations, and maintaining the Agency's neutrality and technical integrity. He firmly refutes claims of information sharing with external entities and clarifies that attacks on nuclear facilities do not fundamentally alter the IAEA's verification methodologies, which are designed to handle such eventualities. The DG's statements aim to reinforce the IAEA's role as an independent technical body, guided by established norms and procedures, even amidst political tensions and security concerns.