World order in transition, but U.S. is still a key ally for Europe, Finnish president says

Key Concepts: World Order Transition, Transatlantic Partnership, European Conventional Defense, U.S. Nuclear Umbrella, NATO Deterrent Pillars, Nuclear Posture Shift, Diplomatic De-escalation/Escalation, Arctic Security, Russia's Strategic Mistakes, Article 5 (NATO), Russia's Imperialism.

World Order in Transition and European Security

President Alexander Stubb of Finland challenges the assertion by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and a conference report that the current world order is "over," with President Trump blamed for "taking the axe" to European security. Stubb argues that the world order is merely in "transition," emphasizing the need "not to throw the baby out with the bathwater." He provides historical context, noting that world orders typically last for specific durations (e.g., two decades after WWI, four after WWII, three after the Cold War). For Stubb, the continued centrality of the transatlantic partnership is paramount during this shift.

European Defense Capabilities and Nuclear Deterrence

Addressing "enormous angst" among some Europeans regarding their conventional defense capabilities and a perceived lack of trust in the United States, Stubb strongly refutes the idea that Europe cannot defend itself. He highlights Finland's robust conventional defense posture, which is based on its capability to defend itself, particularly given its 830-mile border with Russia.

Finland's Conventional Defense Capabilities:

• One million men and women trained in Arctic conditions.
• 62 F-18 fighter jets, with an additional 64 F-35s recently purchased.
• Extensive long-range missiles (air, land, and sea).
• Possession of the largest artillery in Europe, shared with Poland.

Regarding nuclear weapons, Stubb asserts the continued necessity of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. He explains that NATO's deterrence is based on three pillars, with nuclear deterrence being one of them. While the UK and France possess some nuclear weapons, the "key umbrella comes from the United States." He dismisses any doubt about the U.S. nuclear umbrella, even in light of discussions between Chancellor Merz and President Macron about France potentially providing nuclear protection to Europe.

Stubb acknowledges a changing global nuclear posture, moving from a bipolar system (U.S. and Russia) to a tripolar one with China's growing arsenal (currently 600 warheads, projected to reach 1,500). While Europe must consider its own protection, he believes it is in the "vested interest of the United States to give the nuclear umbrella to Europe and for Europe to accept that as well."

Diplomacy with President Trump and the Greenland Incident

Stubb, who has a close relationship with President Trump, discusses the diplomatic approach to dealing with him, particularly in the context of the Greenland crisis. He notes that some European counterparts believe that "strength, the European strength pushing back against President Trump, rather than giving in," was a more effective strategy.

Stubb outlines his diplomatic philosophy: "Always in diplomacy you can either de-escalate or then you can escalate to de-escalate." He advises that it's "always best to do the de-escalation publicly and the escalation privately." He explains the Greenland situation involved three scenarios:

1. Good: De-escalate, find an "off-ramp," and focus on Arctic security.
2. Bad: A trade war and increased tariffs.
3. Ugly: The continued threat of a military confrontation. He implies that scenarios two and three were "played out" (likely privately, through "escalation to de-escalate") to ultimately achieve scenario one, emphasizing the importance of such "off-ramps and processes."

Russia as a Long-Term Threat

Despite Russia building up military bases and infrastructure along Finland's border, Stubb states that Finland is "not concerned." He accepts the historical presence of Russian/Soviet troops and anticipates more after the current war. He firmly believes Russia is "losing this war" in Ukraine, calling its initiation a "strategic mistake of Putin."

Putin's Strategic Miscalculations:

• Goal: Russify Ukraine. Outcome: Ukraine is "becoming European."
• Goal: Prevent NATO enlargement. Outcome: Got Finland and Sweden into NATO.
• Goal: Keep European defense expenditure down. Outcome: European defense spending is increasing, "going to 5 percent."

Stubb dismisses the rhetoric that Nordic or Baltic countries are "next" for Russian aggression, stating, "No, they're not. I mean, Russia is not going to test Article 5." However, he unequivocally states that Russia is a "long-term threat" due to its "DNA" of "imperialism and expansion" throughout its history, and its inability to honestly cope with its past. He stresses the future need to prevent these imperialistic threats from extending to the Southern Caucasus or Central Asia.

Regarding Russia's seriousness in ending the war, Stubb expresses skepticism. While some suggest Russia seeks to acquire more territory, Stubb believes Russia "is not able to end this war because the social and political cost for Putin not being able to pay the soldiers when they go back is too high." This assessment underpins his skepticism about Putin's true intentions for peace.

Conclusion

President Alexander Stubb presents a pragmatic and confident perspective on the evolving global landscape. He advocates for a strong, conventionally capable Europe, firmly anchored in the transatlantic partnership and reliant on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. While acknowledging Russia as a long-term imperialistic threat, he expresses confidence in NATO's deterrence and highlights Russia's strategic failures in Ukraine. His insights underscore the importance of robust defense, strategic diplomacy, and a clear-eyed assessment of geopolitical realities.