Why did the last US-Russia nuclear arms treaty lapse? | Inside Story

Key Concepts

• New START Treaty: The last remaining nuclear arms control treaty between the US and Russia, expired this week.
• Strategic Warheads: Nuclear warheads deployed on missiles or bombers.
• Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): An international treaty aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.
• Doomsday Clock: A symbolic representation of the likelihood of a human-caused global catastrophe, currently set at 85 seconds to midnight.
• INF Treaty: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, a previous arms control agreement.
• Nuclear Deterrence: The concept of preventing attack by possessing the capability to retaliate with nuclear weapons.
• Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW): A treaty adopted in 2017 aiming for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Lapse of New START: Rising Nuclear Risks

The New START Treaty, the last remaining nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and Russia, expired this week, marking a significant moment in international peace and security. For over five decades, such treaties have provided a framework for managing the most dangerous weapons in the world, but the absence of a replacement raises concerns about a potential new era of nuclear escalation. The program explores the reasons behind the treaty’s lapse, the associated dangers, and the possibilities for future agreements.

Historical Context & The Cuban Missile Crisis

The threat of nuclear annihilation has loomed since the end of World War II, with the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis representing a particularly close call. The first agreement on weapons control between the US and the Soviet Union came a decade later, in 1972, and at least one treaty has been in force ever since – until this week. This consistent framework provided a degree of stability despite ongoing geopolitical tensions.

New START Treaty Provisions

The 2010 New START treaty, signed by Barack Obama and Dmitri Medvedev, contained three key provisions:

1. Warhead Limit: A limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads for each side (warheads placed on missiles or bombers).
2. Delivery System Limit: A limit of 700 on the number of deployed and non-deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
3. Launcher Limit: A limit of 800 on other missiles, bombers, and launchers in reserve, which could be brought into use.

The treaty also included verification measures to ensure compliance.

Reasons for the Treaty’s Expiration

The expiration of New START is attributed to a combination of factors, including a perceived lack of urgency, deliberate policy choices, and the perspectives of current leadership in both the US and Russia. Former US President Donald Trump expressed a desire for a new agreement that included China, arguing that it was “impossible” to negotiate effectively without China’s participation due to its rapidly growing nuclear stockpile. However, Beijing has indicated it will not consider joining such an agreement until its arsenal reaches parity with the US and Russia. Discussions in Abu Dhabi between US and Russian delegations regarding a six-month extension failed to yield results.

Current Nuclear Arsenals

As of the program’s airing:

• Russia: 5,459 warheads
• United States: 5,177 warheads
• China: 600 warheads

Notably, both the US and China are currently increasing their nuclear arsenals.

Increased Risk & The Doomsday Clock

The expiration of New START is considered to significantly increase the risk of nuclear conflict. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists recently set the Doomsday Clock to 85 seconds to midnight – the closest it has ever been – reflecting the heightened global threat level. This symbolic measure underscores the urgency of finding a path towards renewed arms control.

Perspectives from Experts

Nikolai Soooff (Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation): While acknowledging the danger, Soooff believes an immediate arms race is unlikely due to the resilience of the strategic balance. He emphasizes the importance of initiating negotiations for a new treaty as soon as possible, warning that the absence of guardrails could lead to a cycle of escalation based on worst-case assumptions. He also highlighted the increasing relevance of long-range conventional weapons and the potential for nuclear buildup in Europe.

Rebecca Johnson (International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons): Johnson argues the world is becoming increasingly dangerous and emphasizes the need to prevent any use of nuclear weapons in conflict. She highlighted the importance of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and the growing international movement towards nuclear disarmament, emphasizing the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.

Thomas Countryman (Former US Assistant Secretary of State): Countryman asserts that the treaty’s demise stems from a lack of serious effort from both the US and Russia. He points to the ascendancy of “nuclear hawks” in both countries and the absence of concrete proposals from the US for initiating negotiations. He also notes the challenges posed by China’s reluctance to engage in arms control talks.

Potential Future Scenarios & Challenges

Several challenges complicate the path towards a new agreement:

• China’s Inclusion: Securing China’s participation remains a major hurdle.
• European Deterrence: The potential for increased nuclear capabilities in the UK and France, driven by a desire for independent European deterrence, adds another layer of complexity.
• Missile Defense Systems: Russia’s insistence on linking offensive arms control to limitations on missile defense systems presents a further obstacle.
• Political Will: A lack of political will and the influence of vested interests within the defense industry pose significant challenges.

Actionable Steps & Key Takeaways

The experts agree on the need for dialogue and a renewed commitment to arms control. Key steps include:

• Initiating a dialogue between the US and Russia to explore the possibility of a new treaty.
• Engaging China in discussions about nuclear arms control.
• Strengthening the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and promoting its universal adoption.
• Raising the profile of nuclear risks within the international community, particularly among non-nuclear weapon states.

Conclusion:

The expiration of the New START treaty represents a dangerous turning point in international security. While an immediate arms race is not inevitable, the absence of binding limits on strategic arsenals significantly increases the risk of miscalculation and escalation. Renewed diplomatic efforts, a willingness to compromise, and a commitment to arms control are essential to avert a potentially catastrophic outcome. The program underscores the urgency of addressing this issue and the need for proactive engagement from all stakeholders.