What's next for the U.S. and China in a new era of confrontation

Key Concepts

• US-China Confrontation: The evolving and increasingly complex relationship between the United States and China, impacting global security and economics.
• Xi Jinping’s Consolidation of Power: The centralization of authority under Xi Jinping, including purges within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and potential moves towards extending his term.
• Taiwan: The status of Taiwan remains a critical flashpoint, with discussions around US commitment to its defense and China’s potential for invasion.
• Trade and Technology Competition: The economic rivalry between the US and China, particularly concerning tariffs, semiconductor technology, and intellectual property.
• Nuclear Proliferation: China’s rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal and its implications for global strategic stability.
• Minimal Deterrence: China’s stated nuclear doctrine, aiming for a credible second-strike capability.
• One China Policy: The US policy regarding Taiwan, acknowledging the People’s Republic of China but maintaining unofficial relations with Taiwan.

US-China Relations: A New Era of Confrontation

The US-China relationship is entering a new phase characterized by increased confrontation, impacting global economics, security, and alliances. This dynamic is significantly shaped by Xi Jinping’s unprecedented consolidation of power within China, including a recent and notable purge of high-ranking military officials, most prominently General Zhang Youxia, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff equivalent. This event, the largest such purge in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) since the 1970s, raises questions about the stability and motivations behind Xi Jinping’s actions.

The Internal Dynamics of Xi Jinping’s China

Kurt Campbell notes that understanding the internal decision-making processes within China, particularly regarding military affairs, remains challenging. Theories suggest the purges are motivated by a combination of anti-corruption efforts, improving military readiness, and, increasingly, political motivations. Yun Sun emphasizes that removals within the Chinese government and PLA are rarely based on professional disagreements, but rather on political considerations, particularly as China approaches the 21st Party Congress in 2027. This congress will determine whether Xi Jinping will seek a fourth term and which positions he will retain – party leader, state president, and Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman. The purges may be linked to resistance within the party to Xi Jinping’s continued rule.

Impact on Military Readiness and Taiwan

Randall Schriver suggests the purges, while politically motivated to secure Xi Jinping’s position, could diminish the PLA’s readiness. A leadership shaken by unpredictability is likely to become more risk-averse, potentially hindering innovation and operational effectiveness. This is particularly relevant given the US intelligence community’s assessment that Xi Jinping has instructed the PLA to be prepared to invade Taiwan by next year. However, Schriver clarifies this doesn’t necessarily mean an invasion is imminent, but rather a preparation for potential action.

The Question of US Intervention in Taiwan

The discussion centered on whether defending Taiwan is in US interests, even to the point of military intervention. Michael Swaine argues that a war over Taiwan would be a major conflict, exceeding the scale of the Korean War, and doesn’t align with core US interests or credibility with allies. He believes the potential costs outweigh the benefits. Schriver counters that the US has a legal obligation to maintain the capacity to defend Taiwan, citing its economic importance (seventh largest trading partner, sixth largest destination for agricultural products) and strategic location. Campbell emphasizes the importance of deterring conflict through diplomacy and defense capabilities, highlighting the historical success of maintaining peace and stability in the region for decades.

Trade, Technology, and Nuclear Concerns

The conversation shifted to potential concessions President Trump might seek from China and vice versa. Campbell outlines Trump’s priorities: increased agricultural purchases, Boeing plane sales, and potentially easing restrictions on Chinese investment in the US. In return, China is likely to demand the lifting of tariffs, the removal of technology restrictions imposed during the Biden administration, and adjustments to US policy on Taiwan, potentially moving towards opposing Taiwan independence.

The Semiconductor Dilemma

Yun Sun argues that President Trump’s focus on addressing the trade imbalance with China will likely lead to increased sales of semiconductors to China, as these represent a key US export. However, Campbell cautions that this approach is based on a flawed understanding of Xi Jinping’s long-term goal of achieving technological supremacy. He believes the idea that China will remain reliant on US chips for the next 20 years is unrealistic.

China’s Nuclear Expansion

The discussion highlighted China’s rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal, projected to exceed 1000 warheads by 2030. Schriver notes the end of the New START treaty, combined with reports of low-yield nuclear tests, signals a concerning trend. Sun explains that China’s nuclear strategy, based on “minimal deterrence,” is influenced by both the size of the US nuclear arsenal and its missile defense capabilities. China seeks a credible second-strike capability to ensure mutual vulnerability, and is unlikely to negotiate arms control until this is achieved.

Trump’s Approach and Future Outlook

The panelists expressed concern about the lack of deep China expertise within the Trump administration, with Campbell stating that President Trump himself is the primary policymaker on China. This, combined with his affinity for authoritarian leaders, raises questions about the direction of US-China policy. Swaine noted that Trump may prefer to avoid discussing Taiwan altogether, but Xi Jinping may force the issue, seeking concessions on the matter.

Notable Quotes

• Kurt Campbell: “Look, I respect Michael. I tend to disagree. I think there are clear areas, certain kinds of AI chips, certain kinds of lithography for semiconductor design, that there is bipartisan agreement that these are areas of strategic advantage.”
• Yun Sun: “I think President Trump has made his agenda very clear, is to address the trade imbalance with China. And if you want to address the trade imbalance with China, a key question is what the US is willing to sell to China that can boost our export to China.”
• Randall Schriver: “Nobody wants war with China. But I think given our legal obligations and our interests, we need to be prepared for the purposes of deterrence, which is what our policy says right now.”
• Michael Swaine: “I don't think it's ultimately in the US interest to go to a war which would be a major war, unlike anything we've seen since the Korean War with China over Taiwan.”

Conclusion

The US-China relationship is at a critical juncture, marked by increasing competition and a complex interplay of political, economic, and military factors. Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power, coupled with China’s growing military capabilities and ambitions, presents significant challenges for the United States. The potential for miscalculation and escalation, particularly regarding Taiwan, remains high. The future trajectory of the relationship will depend on the choices made by both Washington and Beijing, and the ability to manage their differences while avoiding a catastrophic conflict. The upcoming meeting between President Trump and Xi Jinping will be a crucial test of their willingness to find common ground and navigate this increasingly fraught landscape.