What does Russia hope to gain in Africa and at what cost? | DW News

Summary of YouTube Video: Russia's Ambitions in Africa

Key Concepts:

• Vagner Group: Russian mercenary group, previously active in Africa.
• Africa Corps: Paramilitary group overseen by Russia's Defense Ministry, replacing Vagner in some regions.
• Sahel States: Nijair, Bikinaaso, and Mali, experiencing coups and shifting alliances towards Russia.
• Soft Power: Russia's use of education programs, cultural centers, and media to influence public opinion.
• Resource Concessions: Access to resources (e.g., gold mines) granted in exchange for security support.
• Disinformation: Spread of false or misleading information, often through digital media.
• AES (Alliance of Sahel States): Emerging alliance of Nijair, Bikinaaso, and Mali, supported by Russia.
• ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States.

1. Russia's Strategic Shift in Africa:

• From Vagner to Africa Corps: Vagner Group is withdrawing from countries like Mali, with its units being taken over by the Africa Corps, a paramilitary group under the direct control of Moscow's Defense Ministry. Analysts estimate that up to 80% of the Africa Corps are former Vagner fighters.
• Kremlin's Ambitions: Kremlin spokesman Dmitri Pescov stated Russia's intention to "comprehensively develop" interaction with African countries, focusing on "economic and investment interaction" and "defense and security."
• Geographic Focus: Russia's influence is most profound in the Sahel states (Nijair, Bikinaaso, and Mali), all of which have experienced coups and severed ties with Western powers.

2. Vagner's Activities and Impact:

• Central African Republic (CAR): Vagner has been present since 2018, protecting President Felon Tuadera.
• Equatorial Guinea: Expanded presence in November of last year, providing security for the president.
• Other Engagements: Brief stints in Madagascar and Mosambique, reported operations in Libya and Sudan.
• Mali: Vagner claims to have brought all regional capitals under the control of the Malian army and killed thousands of militants. However, this claim is disputed.

3. The Situation in Mali:

• Resurgence of Jihadist Attacks: Despite Vagner's claims, jihadist attacks are escalating in the Sahel region, including attacks by al-Qaeda-linked groups.
• Beverly Oiang's Analysis (Center for Strategic and International Studies):
  • The insurgency in Mali has continued, with attacks spreading from the north and central regions towards the west and south.
  • Russia is trying to consolidate control over paramilitaries, addressing concerns about operational command, human rights abuses, and heavy-handed tactics associated with Vagner.
  • The transition to Africa Corps may be a rebranding effort to distance from the Vagner name while maintaining influence.
  • Malian authorities prefer to portray Russian support as coming from "military instructors" rather than "mercenaries."

4. Russia's Soft Power and Economic Influence:

• Limited Soft Power: The number of Russian cultural centers in Africa is still under 10.
• Authenticity of Propaganda: Pro-Russian messages are often perpetuated by local groups and activists, making them seem more authentic, especially in urban areas. However, the level of interaction with Russian propaganda is not as high in rural areas.
• Limited Economic Leverage: Russia's economic cloud is limited compared to China or the EU.
• Economic Strategy: Russia focuses on countries with limited diplomatic and commercial choices, offering technical support in sectors like mining.
• Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs): Many MOUs have been signed, but their implementation is still pending.

5. Resource Concessions and Neocolonialism:

• CAR Model: Vagner gained de facto control of mining areas and expanded its economic interests in the CAR due to weaker regulations.
• Mali's Stronger Regulations: Russia has not been able to replicate the CAR model in Mali due to stronger mining regulations. However, Russia has pledged to help Mali build a refinery and train technical staff.
• Win-Win Partnership Perception: Pro-military government supporters in the Sahel see the relationship with Russia as a "win-win partnership" on "equal terms."
• Sovereign Choice Argument: Governments argue that they are making a "sovereign choice" to partner with Russia, similar to previous relationships with Western powers but with different terms and conditions.

6. Disinformation and Media Operations:

• Proliferation of Digital Media: Increased access to smartphones and civic education gaps have made the region vulnerable to disinformation.
• Africa Initiative: A pro-Kremlin media entity operating in the region, training local journalists and building a sense of authenticity in narratives.
• Denial of Facts: Some narratives deny facts about the Ukraine conflict.
• Restricted Information: Governments are becoming less open to sharing information, and journalists are being trained against undermining security forces.
• Dominant Narratives: Disinformation propagated by Russian trolls is becoming the dominant narrative, especially among urban youths.

7. Regional Stability and the Gulf of Guinea:

• Threat to Stability: Russia's influence poses a threat to stability in the Gulf of Guinea and to sustained democracy in the region.
• Opportunistic Patterns: Anti-government protests with Russian flags have been observed in Nigeria.
• Regional Split: The emergence of the AES, supported by Russia, contrasts with ECOWAS, creating geopolitical rifts.
• Undermined Relations: Intra-country relations between the Sahel and West African states are being undermined by disinformation and contrasting relationships with Russia and the West.
• Proactive Measures: Countries are becoming more proactive in maintaining cooperation with Russia while finding pragmatic ways of engaging with the Sahel to prevent a future crisis.

8. Conclusion:

Russia's strategy in Africa involves a shift from the Vagner Group to the Africa Corps, a focus on economic and security cooperation, and the exploitation of resource concessions. While Russia's soft power and economic influence are limited, it leverages disinformation and partnerships with governments seeking alternatives to Western powers. This strategy poses a threat to regional stability, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea, and requires proactive measures to maintain cooperation and prevent future crises.