‘There’s no deal to be done with Putin’, with Lt General (Retired) H.R. McMaster & Boris Johnson

Key Concepts

• Western Failures in Addressing Russian Threat: Inconsistent and delayed responses to Russian aggression since 2014.
• Putin's Motivations: Driven by a desire to restore Russian greatness and a sense of lost honor from the Soviet Union's collapse.
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Capacity: Significant domestic production capabilities, but requires financing and procurement to scale.
• European Defense Incoherence: Fragmentation and inefficiency in European defense industrial bases compared to a more unified US approach.
• Strategic Deterrence: Emphasis on hard power and forward-positioned capable joint forces as the foundation of deterrence.
• "Woke" Military vs. Lethality: Debate on the impact of social and political agendas on military effectiveness and the need for a focus on lethality.
• Coalition of the Capable vs. Willing: The necessity of actual military capability, not just willingness, to address security threats.
• Security Guarantees for Ukraine: The need for a robust security commitment beyond pledges, potentially involving a European deployment.
• Russian Imperialism: The view that the problem is not just Putin but the broader Russian nationalistic and imperialistic drive.
• Chinese Role in the Conflict: Concerns about China underwriting Russia's war effort and its strategic implications for Europe.
• Multi-Year Contracts: A proposed solution for industry to scale up production by providing long-term financial commitments.

Panel Discussion: The Strategic Architecture of Victory

This panel, moderated by Dom Nichols at the Ukraine Freedom Summit in London, featured HR McMaster, Boris Johnson, and Michael Kaufman, with Sergey Visotski contributing insights from the Ukrainian defense industry. The discussion focused on strategic failures, Putin's motivations, European defense, Ukrainian capabilities, and the path to victory.

Western Failures and European Response to Russian Aggression

• Inconsistent Response: Speakers highlighted a significant failure by successive European leaders to unite and act decisively against the growing Russian threat, particularly between 2014 and 2022.
• 2014 vs. 2022: A distinction was drawn between the largely "performative" Western response in 2014 (sanctions) and the more galvanizing, albeit delayed, support following the full-scale invasion in 2022.
• "Turning the Tide" Rhetoric: Boris Johnson expressed concern over NATO Secretary General Mark Rutter's statement about "turning the tide" nearly four years into the conflict, suggesting a lack of urgency.
• Perceived Weakness as Provocation: HR McMaster argued that Putin is provoked by perceived weakness, citing examples like the Obama administration's "reset" and President Biden's Geneva red lines, which he believes signaled a green light for further aggression.

Putin's Motivations and Strategic Goals

• Restoring Russian Greatness: HR McMaster emphasized that Putin is driven by an obsession with restoring Russia to national greatness, stemming from the perceived loss of honor with the Soviet Union's collapse.
• Subsuming Ukraine and Former Warsaw Pact: Putin's goal is to subsume Ukraine and create subservient relationships across the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union.
• Unstoppable Drive: McMaster stated, "he won't stop until he is stopped," underscoring the belief that Putin's ambitions are not limited and require decisive action to halt.
• "Better the Devil You Don't Know" Rejection: In response to the idea that a post-Putin Russia might be worse, McMaster argued it's hard to imagine anything worse than the current regime, and that a clear demonstration of Putin's failure is needed to foster an alternative.

Defining Victory for Ukraine

• Ukrainian Self-Determination: The panel agreed that Ukraine must define victory for itself.
• Restoration of 1991 Borders: Boris Johnson stated his belief that victory means Ukraine having the entirety of its 1991 borders.
• Rejection of Compromise on Sovereignty: Any deal that cedes Ukrainian sovereignty is deemed unacceptable and "utterly pointless" in the belief it would appease Putin.
• Potential for De Facto Acceptance: A possibility for Putin to compromise might involve freezing along the line of contact, a "regretful but de facto acceptance" of current gains, though this would be difficult for Ukraine to accept.

European Defense Industrial Incoherence and Collaboration

• Fragmentation: HR McMaster pointed to the incoherence in European defense, citing the example of 17 different main battle tank models in Europe versus one in the US, and 29 destroyers/frigates versus four in the US.
• Need for Efficiency: The discussion called for moving away from division, inefficiency, and waste in European defense.
• Airbus as a Counter-Example: Boris Johnson highlighted Airbus as a successful model of European technological leadership and collaboration, suggesting similar models could be applied to defense.
• Munitions Shortages: Despite calls for collaboration, the panel noted that Europe is still not producing enough shells or drones to adequately support Ukraine.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Capacity and Financing Needs

• Domestic Production Dominance: Sergey Visotski stated that nearly 60% of weapons used on the front line are produced in Ukraine, with a combat efficiency rate of 80-90% due to on-site servicing.
• Surplus Capacity, Not Investment: Visotski clarified that Ukrainian defense companies have surplus capacity (working at 20-50% of capacity for various items) and do not need "investment" in the traditional sense, but rather "financing" or "procurement" to keep factories operational and supply the Ukrainian armed forces.
• Internal Relocation and Rebuilding: Ukrainian companies have relocated 250,000 tons of equipment and built over 20 new facilities, primarily in western Ukraine, through internal investment.
• Financing Model Needed: The need for a new financing model, such as the Danish example of financing the final product, is crucial to increase Ukrainian-made products at the front line.
• Relocating Allied Spending: A proposal was made to redirect a portion of Western spending on expensive equipment towards Ukrainian military industry, which could produce combat-proven systems at a significantly lower cost.
• Under-Capitalized Sector: Michael Kaufman described Ukraine's defense sector as "heavily undercapitalized" and highlighted the need for foreign exchange, suggesting exports as a potential revenue stream.
• Access to Western Markets: Ukrainian companies need partnerships with Western firms to gain access to Western markets and navigate the dominant prime contractor structures.
• Chinese Components: A significant challenge identified was the reliance on Chinese components for electronic warfare systems, with limited alternatives available in Ukraine, Europe, or the US.

Strategic Deterrence and US Force Posture

• Hard Power as Deterrent: HR McMaster stressed that hard power, specifically forward-positioned capable joint forces operating within alliances like NATO, is essential for deterrence.
• Critique of "Integrated Deterrence": McMaster criticized the concept of "integrated deterrence" as potentially ineffective, suggesting that threats of sanctions or intelligence releases are insufficient on their own.
• Capacity vs. Exquisite Capabilities: The US defense structure has become too efficient, trading off capacity and industrial base size for fewer, more expensive capabilities. The need is for both exquisite capabilities and sufficient capacity.
• US Force Posture Review: A potential shift of US capabilities from Europe to the Indo-Pacific theater would have a negative effect on the war in Ukraine, as it would reduce the demonstrated hard power.

The "Woke" Military Debate and Focus on Lethality

• Reaction to Social Agendas: HR McMaster described the renaming of the Department of Defense to the Department of War as a reaction to what he perceives as the Biden and Obama administrations pushing a "social agenda" and "political agenda" detrimental to combat effectiveness.
• Equality of Outcome vs. Opportunity: The critique focused on the idea of "equality of outcome" and the "valorization of victimhood" over the traditional military evaluation based on courage, honor, and sacrifice.
• Focus on Lethality: The buzzword "lethality" was highlighted as a key focus, though it was acknowledged that the Department of Defense has a broader range of non-lethal activities.

Coalition of the Capable and European Security Commitments

• Capability Over Willingness: The discussion emphasized the need for a "coalition of the capable" rather than just the "willing," as willingness alone does not translate to effective action.
• European Deployment: Michael Kaufman suggested that a European deployment, such as a multinational division, is an almost inevitable outcome to provide security commitments to Ukraine post-war.
• Boots on the Ground and Air Missions: Such a commitment would likely involve boots on the ground and air missions, potentially coordinated with US support.
• "Fake It Till You Make It": Kaufman described the current European approach as a "fake it till you make it" scenario, where European nations need to make their commitments real.
• Reassurance and Deterrence Force: The value of such a force would be to provide hope, prevent demobilization of the Ukrainian army, and act as a reassurance and deterrence force, though not to engage in direct combat with Russian forces.
• Ambiguity and Deterrence: The presence of such a force offers a degree of deterrence through ambiguity, and concerns about casualties should not paralyze action.
• Ceasefire Dependency: The panel questioned the logic of waiting for a ceasefire, as ceasefires with Russia are rarely perfect and often break down.

The Future of Russia and the Role of Putin

• Putin as an Element, Not the Sole Problem: Sergey Visotski argued that the "real problem" is the Russian nation, encompassing centuries of imperialism and a desire for empire, with leaders like Putin merely being instruments of this drive.
• Potential for a "Pause": While hoping for Putin's demise, Visotski suggested a potential 10-year "pause" to prepare for the "next Putin."
• Personalist Authoritarian Regime: Michael Kaufman acknowledged that while it's a "Russia problem," the leader's personal views and fixations in a personalist authoritarian regime do matter. However, he believes the concern about what happens after a regime transition should be secondary to the immediate need to settle the war.

Questions from the Audience

• US/UK Policy Shift: A question was raised about shifting US and UK policy from economic cooperation to treating Ukraine as a military threat, necessitating deliveries regardless of cost, as current approaches are seen as business-oriented, leading to delays.
• Replacing US Deterrent: In the context of US troop withdrawals to Asia, a question was posed about Europe's replacement of American deterrence, potentially with tactical nuclear weapons for countries like the Baltics and Poland.
• Chinese Component Dependency: A producer of electronic warfare systems highlighted the critical reliance on Chinese components and the difficulty in finding alternatives, asking for strategic solutions.
• Post-Putin Russia: The question of whether the situation would differ if Putin were not in power was raised, with the consensus leaning towards the problem being systemic within Russia.
• Depolarizing Politics: A question sought solutions for depolarizing politics and society to bridge divides within NATO and address the threat effectively.
• Boris Johnson's Actions as PM: If Boris Johnson were Prime Minister again, he would focus on securing the $250 billion frozen Russian assets, campaigning for a "coalition of the willing" to be a "coalition of the capable," and advocating for Ukraine's immediate inclusion in the Western security architecture.
• Multi-Year Contracts: Michael Kaufman reiterated that the solution for industry to scale up production is multi-year contracts and funding, a well-known but often unimplemented strategy.

Conclusion and Takeaways

The panel underscored the critical need for a strategic re-evaluation of Western policy towards Russia, moving beyond performative actions to decisive, long-term commitments. Key takeaways include:

• Urgency is paramount: Europe's historical hesitancy to confront Russian aggression has had severe consequences.
• Putin's motivations are ideological and expansionist: Appeasement is not a viable strategy.
• Ukrainian resilience and industrial capacity are significant assets: These need to be leveraged through proper financing and procurement.
• European defense needs radical reform: Fragmentation and inefficiency must be addressed to build a credible security architecture.
• Hard power and clear deterrence are essential: Perceived weakness emboldens adversaries.
• A robust security commitment to Ukraine is vital: This extends beyond arms pledges to potential deployments and integration into Western security structures.
• The problem is systemic within Russia: While Putin is a key figure, the underlying imperialistic drive of the Russian nation poses a long-term challenge.
• Global interconnectedness requires strategic solutions: Addressing dependencies on actors like China is crucial for long-term security.
• Political will and clear communication are key: Leaders must articulate the stakes and galvanize support for sustained action.