The US Ambassador to China Says President Xi Seeks ‘Total Control’ Of Military

US-China Relations: A Detailed Account of Negotiations and Deliverables

Key Concepts: Trade Truce, Fentanyl Crisis, Rare Earths, WTO Imbalances, Trust Deficit, Bilateral Negotiations, PLA Purge, Commercial Deals (Boeing, Soybeans), Jimmy Lai Case, “America First” Doctrine, Geopolitical Rebalancing.

I. Background and Objectives of the Trump-Xi Relationship

The core objective of the US approach to China, as outlined, is to “buy some time and space” for negotiators – Scott Bessent, He Lifeng, and Jamieson Greer – to forge a comprehensive trade deal. This strategy originated following the meeting in Busan, where President Xi Jinping extended an invitation to President Trump to visit Beijing in April, reciprocated with an invitation to President Xi to visit the US in August or September. The April meeting aimed to “solidify the objectives and criteria of success” for ongoing negotiations. The initial impetus for this engagement stemmed from the countermeasures implemented during 2025, prompting both leaders to recognize the benefit of a temporary “time out” to facilitate progress.

II. Compliance with the Busan Truce & Specific Agreements

Both sides have largely fulfilled the agreements reached in Busan. Specifically, China is on track to meet its soybean purchase commitments. A significant achievement highlighted is China’s response to the fentanyl crisis. On the next Monday scheduled, China placed an embargo on the 13 precursor chemicals used in fentanyl production, specifically targeting exports to North America. Crucially, this is coupled with unprecedented cooperation between US and Chinese law enforcement agencies within China to combat fentanyl trafficking. This cooperation is described as a “major encouragement.” Regarding rare earths and rare earth magnets, compliance with export license agreements is also reported as satisfactory.

III. Evolution of Communication Channels

Communication between the US and China has demonstrably improved since the Busan truce. This improvement is described as “multidimensional,” encompassing four phone calls and letter exchanges between Presidents Trump and Xi, as well as increased interagency dialogue. This includes cooperation between trade negotiators and law enforcement officials. Efforts are also underway to encourage more US legislators to visit China, with Adam Smith’s visit in the fall of the previous year cited as a success. This represents a shift from periods where the US felt “in the penalty box” and communication was limited.

IV. Addressing the Trust Deficit

While a “truce” exists, it is not a “lasting peace.” Rebuilding trust is a central focus. The speaker reports being “well received” by Chinese leadership, indicating a current level of “respect and trust” that is “building.” However, the root of the distrust is traced back to 2001, when China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) and gained “most favored nation” and “developing country” status. This led to perceived imbalances, including state subsidies and intellectual property transfer, which the current administration is attempting to rectify. Regular communication between He Lifeng and Scott Bessent, including meetings at Davos and Busan, is presented as evidence of this rebuilding trust.

V. Geopolitical Context: Alliances and Shifting Global Dynamics

The speaker addresses concerns about other nations, including US allies, “cozying up” to Beijing as a “hedge” against the US. However, the speaker argues that US actions, particularly in resolving the “magnet crisis,” have actually galvanized allies to support the US position. Twelve trade deals completed with allies in 2025 are cited as evidence of this. The speaker also notes increased defense spending by NATO members, attributing this to President Trump’s pressure. Concerns about US policies potentially alienating allies, such as the threat of tariffs on Canadian goods, are acknowledged, but downplayed, emphasizing the enduring nature of the US-Canada trading relationship. The speaker frames this as allies pursuing their own self-interest, consistent with President Trump’s “America First” policy (which is clarified as “America First, not America Alone”).

VI. China’s Regional Ambitions and US Response

The speaker acknowledges China’s desire for a sphere of influence in the Western Pacific and Eastern Hemisphere, contrasting it with the US’s historical focus on the Western Hemisphere (referencing the Monroe Doctrine). The current US strategy is to address these competing interests through bilateral negotiations and a broader effort to “reform and rebalance” global trade and geopolitical relationships. The situation in Venezuela and Greenland are mentioned as examples of US interests being asserted.

VII. Internal Developments within China: The PLA Purge

A significant development is the ongoing purge within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Central Military Commission. The speaker notes that of the seven members of the Central Military Commission, only Xi Jinping remains from the previous iteration. The investigation of Vice Chairman Zhang, a “lifelong family friend” of Xi Jinping, is described as a “major development.” This is interpreted as Xi Jinping’s attempt to consolidate control and address decades of corruption within the military, which historically relied on self-funding through commercial deals.

VIII. Potential Commercial Deliverables

The speaker expresses hope for significant commercial deals, particularly with Boeing, which has not secured a major order from China since 2016. The embassy in Beijing actively works to facilitate such deals, alongside agreements related to agricultural products like soybeans, lumber, and sorghum. A Boeing deal is considered “very important” for both countries.

IX. The Jimmy Lai Case and US Intervention

President Trump has directly appealed to President Xi Jinping for the release of Jimmy Lai, a high-profile national security case in Hong Kong, citing “humanitarian reasons.” This issue was raised during the Busan meeting. While no recent developments have been reported, the speaker indicates that the conversation remains ongoing, pending sentencing and potential appeals.

Conclusion:

The US-China relationship is currently characterized by a pragmatic approach focused on managing competition and securing limited agreements. While a significant trust deficit remains, communication channels are improving, and both sides are demonstrating a willingness to engage. The fentanyl crisis has emerged as a key area of cooperation, and the pursuit of commercial deals, such as a potential Boeing agreement, remains a priority. The broader geopolitical context, including shifting alliances and China’s regional ambitions, adds complexity to the relationship, requiring a strategy of bilateral negotiation and a rebalancing of global power dynamics. The situation is fluid, and continued dialogue and engagement are crucial for managing the inherent tensions and pursuing mutually beneficial outcomes.