Propaganda machine: Russia's plan for global influence • FRANCE 24 English

Russian Propaganda Network: Investigation by Forbidden Stories & The Continent

Key Concepts:

• Vagna/Wagner Group: A Russian paramilitary organization initially involved in mercenary activities, now integrated into Russian intelligence operations.
• SVR (Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki): Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, now directly overseeing the propaganda network.
• Polytology: The company identified as the central coordinating entity for the propaganda operation, financially linked to the SVR.
• Disinformation/Misinformation: The deliberate spread of false or inaccurate information to influence public opinion.
• Propaganda: Information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view.
• Operatives: Individuals deployed to carry out specific tasks within the network, including media manipulation and disinformation campaigns.

1. Overview of the Investigation & Network Expansion

The investigation, a collaboration between Forbidden Stories and The Continent, reveals a sophisticated Russian propaganda network operating across Africa and Latin America. Initially a Vagna operation, the network has transitioned to direct control by the Russian intelligence service, the SVR, following the death of Prigozhin in August 2023. The network’s budget exceeds €7 million and employs a diverse range of specialists – media managers, analysts, PR personnel – to disseminate pro-Russian narratives and anti-Western sentiment. The latest publication identifies 60 Russian operatives involved in the operation, detailing their roles and connections. A key finding is the shift from a primarily mercenary-driven operation (Vagna) to a fully integrated intelligence-led campaign.

2. Geographic Focus & Impact in Africa

The African continent is a primary focus of the propaganda efforts. The Central African Republic (CAR) is identified as the most heavily targeted country, leveraging the existing presence of Vagna mercenaries supporting the regime. Significant activity is also observed in Mali, Nigeria, and Kina. The network actively worked to foster a breakaway regional bloc – the Alliance of Sahian Countries – further solidifying Russian influence in the Sahel region. Surprisingly, South Africa is also a key target, with alleged support from the ruling African National Congress (ANC).

3. Methods of Disinformation & Psychological Impact

The network’s tactics involve paying media outlets and journalists to promote specific narratives. A significant impact observed is the erosion of trust in information itself. The constant propagation of conflicting narratives leads to a pervasive sense that “everything is narrative,” devaluing facts and truth. Specific narratives pushed include claims that Ukraine supports terrorists in Africa, the delegitimization of opposition politicians by linking them to Western interests, and unwavering support for incumbent regimes (except in the Sahel, where coup leaders were supported). The network aims to undermine opposition and secure access/alliance with existing power structures.

4. Operative Profiles & Network Structure

The leaked documents provide biographical information on the operatives. In May 2024, the network comprised 98 individuals based in Russia, Latin America, and Africa. Key figures identified include:

• Sergei Mashkavvich: Global project director.
• Serge Kukin: Head of the analysis department.
• Dimitri Fadev: SVR general and former deputy director of the agency.

These individuals are described as being closely connected to the Kremlin. The network is structured with specialized roles, including media management, analysis, and public relations, all coordinated to spread disinformation.

5. Transition from Vagna to SVR Control: Evidence & Implications

Previously, it was assumed that Russian intelligence services were taking over the network following Prigozhin’s death. The leaked documents now provide concrete evidence of this transition. Financial records demonstrate a direct link between the SVR and Polytology, the coordinating company. This integration into the Russian spy network is significant because it signifies a shift from a relatively opaque mercenary operation to a covert state-sponsored campaign.

6. Comparison with Western Influence & Justification for Scrutiny

The discussion acknowledges that Western nations also engage in influence operations. However, the key distinction lies in transparency. Western funding of media is often public and institutionalized, while the Russian network operates in secrecy, utilizing shadowy networks and individuals linked to organizations with alleged human rights violations. The network also actively pursues specific legislative changes (e.g., mining laws) that benefit Russian interests, bypassing public participation. The lack of transparency and the association with mercenary activities are presented as reasons why this Russian operation is particularly concerning.

7. Concerns for Journalists & the Importance of Exposure

Leia Perushon, the author of the report, expressed concern for journalists working on the ground in affected countries, many of whom are fearful of repercussions for their past or current interactions with the network. The investigation’s primary goal is to expose the network’s operations and identities to empower local populations and journalists with knowledge of who is operating within their countries.

8. Data & Statistics

• Budget: Over €7 million.
• Operatives (May 2024): 98 individuals based in Russia, Latin America, and Africa.
• Identified Operatives: 60 named in the latest publication.

9. Notable Quotes

• Lydia Namubiru: “The biggest impact so far is this kind of devaluation of facts and truth and reduction of everything to mere narrative.”
• Lydia Namubiru: “This is working with shadowy networks rather than working you know openly.”

Conclusion:

The investigation reveals a highly organized and well-funded Russian propaganda network operating with increasing sophistication and direct control from the Kremlin. The network’s activities pose a significant threat to democratic processes and stability in Africa and Latin America, primarily through the erosion of trust in information and the manipulation of political landscapes. The exposure of the network’s operatives and its transition to SVR control is a crucial step towards accountability and mitigating its harmful effects. The emphasis on transparency and the contrast with Western influence operations highlight the unique concerns surrounding this covert and potentially destabilizing campaign.