(P2) Làm thế nào 11% GDP của cả quốc gia bị “rút ruột”? - Những đại án kinh tế rúng động Việt Nam

Key Concepts

• Vạn Thịnh Phát Scandal: A massive financial fraud case in Vietnam involving Trương Mỹ Lan and the alleged embezzlement of trillions of Vietnamese dong from SCB.
• SCB (Saigon Commercial Bank): A commercial bank at the center of the scandal, allegedly used by Trương Mỹ Lan to siphon funds.
• GDP (Gross Domestic Product): The total monetary value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country's borders in a specific time period. The amount embezzled is a significant percentage of Vietnam's GDP.
• Vạn Thịnh Phát Ecosystem: A complex network of over 1,000 companies, subsidiaries, and affiliates allegedly controlled by Trương Mỹ Lan, used to disguise financial activities.
• Shell Companies: Fictitious companies created to facilitate illegal transactions, such as borrowing money from banks or disguising the origin of funds.
• Bond Issuance Fraud: The alleged issuance of fake bonds by Vạn Thịnh Phát companies to raise money from investors, who were misled about the nature and security of these bonds.
• Bribery and Corruption: Allegations of high-ranking officials being bribed to overlook or facilitate the fraudulent activities.
• CIC (Credit Information Center): Vietnam's credit bureau, which the perpetrators allegedly attempted to circumvent to hide excessive credit exposure.
• Offshore Tax Havens: Jurisdictions with low or no corporate taxes, allegedly used by Vạn Thịnh Phát to manage assets and capital.

Trương Mỹ Lan and the Vạn Thịnh Phát Scandal

This episode of Spider Room's "Major Economic Cases Shaking Vietnam" series delves into the case of Trương Mỹ Lan, whose alleged actions have severely impacted Vietnam's economy and public trust. The scandal, involving the alleged siphoning of 11% of Vietnam's GDP, highlights the breakdown of trust in financial institutions, with a bank, typically considered a safe haven, becoming a tool for a nationwide appropriation scheme. This serves as a stark lesson on how greed, amplified by power and complicity, can destabilize an entire financial system.

Background of Trương Mỹ Lan and Vạn Thịnh Phát

Trương Mỹ Lan, born Trương Muội in 1956 in Ho Chi Minh City, is of Chinese-Vietnamese descent. She maintained a low public profile. By the end of 2022, the Vạn Thịnh Phát case was recognized as one of the world's largest financial fraud cases. The total amount allegedly withdrawn by Trương Mỹ Lan from Saigon Commercial Bank (SCB) reached 1,660,000 billion VND, equivalent to 11% of Vietnam's GDP in 2022. The prosecution alleges that Trương Mỹ Lan appropriated 498,000 billion VND (approximately 21 billion USD) from SCB. For context, the combined net worth of the five richest Vietnamese billionaires, according to Forbes in late July 2025, was only 21.2 billion USD.

Trương Mỹ Lan founded Vạn Thịnh Phát Private Enterprise in 1991, which was converted into Vạn Thịnh Phát Limited Liability Company in 1992. By 2012, it became a joint-stock company with a charter capital of 6,000 billion VND, of which Trương Mỹ Lan held 80% (4,000 billion VND). Under her leadership, Vạn Thịnh Phát grew into a massive asset conglomerate, controlling numerous prime real estate projects in central Ho Chi Minh City, including office buildings and commercial centers. A common characteristic of the Vạn Thịnh Phát ecosystem was its subsidiaries with substantial charter capital, ranging from thousands to tens of billions of VND. However, behind these impressive figures lay a murky operational history. Media reports frequently highlighted Vạn Thịnh Phát's alleged acquisition of prime land and the subsequent abandonment of mega-projects, with its vast asset network making it difficult to trace the actual flow of money. In October 2022, Trương Mỹ Lan, along with several senior executives from SCB and Tân Việt Securities (TVSI), was arrested.

The Two Pillars of the Scheme

Trương Mỹ Lan's plan, along with her group of beneficiaries, was built on two main pillars:

1. Bank Control: Gaining control of banks.
2. Concealment of Illicit Funds: Hiding illegally obtained money through the Vạn Thịnh Phát ecosystem, combined with bribing high-ranking officials for protection.

Controlling the Banks

Trương Mỹ Lan allegedly took over three private banks by indirectly owning a majority of their shares through nominees. Specifically, from December 2011, she held 81.43% of SCB's shares through 32 shareholders. She then controlled 98.74% of Việt Nam Tín Nghĩa Commercial Joint Stock Bank through 36 shareholders, and finally, 80.46% ofệ Nhất Commercial Joint Stock Bank through 24 shareholders. These three banks were merged on January 1, 2012, to form the current SCB. Subsequently, Trương Mỹ Lan used 73 shareholders to own 85.6% of SCB and continued to acquire shares held by individuals, increasing her ownership to 91.5%. This gave her absolute control, paving the way for numerous financial irregularities.

With absolute power at SCB, Trương Mỹ Lan easily placed trusted relatives and individuals with expertise in finance and banking in key positions, offering them substantial salaries ranging from 200 to 500 million VND per month, along with bonuses and SCB shares. She transformed SCB into her personal financial tool for mobilizing deposits from individuals and organizations, and for raising capital from various sources outside the normal framework of credit institutions, all to serve her personal interests and the Vạn Thịnh Phát ecosystem.

The Bond Issuance Scheme

According to Trương Mỹ Lan's testimony, in 2018, she received a report from Nguyễn Phương Hồng, Deputy General Director of SCB, detailing the bank's financial strain. SCB was under pressure to pay interest to depositors and deal with non-performing loans totaling 133,000 billion VND from the previous merger of three banks. The situation worsened when the Banking Supervision Agency of the State Bank of Vietnam, after an inspection, reclassified SCB from a bank needing restructuring support to a normally operating bank, imposing restrictions on its credit limits and other activities. SCB faced a deadlock.

In response, Hồng repeatedly proposed to Trương Mỹ Lan that An Đông Company and other Vạn Thịnh Phát ecosystem companies issue bonds to resolve debts and help SCB overcome the crisis. According to the case file, Trương Mỹ Lan invited several individuals for a luncheon at Vạn Thịnh Phát's headquarters at 193-23 Trần Hưng Đạo, District 1, Ho Chi Minh City. Key figures present included Võ Tấn Hoàng Văn (General Director of SCB), Hồ Bửu Phương (Deputy General Director of Vạn Thịnh Phát Group), Đinh Văn Thành (former Chairman of SCB), Nguyễn Tiến Thành (General Director of TVSI), and Nguyễn Phương Hồng (Deputy General Director of SCB). At this meeting, Trương Mỹ Lan proposed using An Đông Company to issue bonds to raise funds for SCB's operations.

Following the agreement, involved individuals were assigned specific tasks. They issued 25 fraudulent bond codes without collateral through four subsidiaries of Vạn Thịnh Phát Group: An Đông, Quang Thuận, Sunyw, and Centra. As of October 10, 2022, Trương Mỹ Lan and her group had allegedly embezzled over 30,000 billion VND from more than 35,800 victims.

SCB signed cooperation agreements with TVSI. SCB acted as a facilitator, identifying, consulting, and introducing customers to sign contracts and purchase bonds from TVSI, which acted as the issuing organization. Võ Tấn Hoàng Văn, as the General Director overseeing SCB's operations, directed relevant departments to implement training plans for over 2,000 sales staff across 239 SCB branches nationwide on bond products and sales techniques. SCB also conducted 25 e-learning courses with 2,344 participants and 12 in-person training sessions with 195 participants. To ensure staff proficiency, SCB organized annual knowledge tests covering all its products and services, with 10-15% of questions related to corporate bonds. This systematic and targeted approach to bond distribution, through a trained sales force, effectively turned SCB's systems into an extension of Vạn Thịnh Phát, deceiving thousands of customers. This seemingly standard training program was, in reality, a method to sell fictitious bonds, leading many individuals, including the elderly and retirees who entrusted their life savings, to financial ruin.

During the investigation, authorities received thousands of complaints from bondholders of companies within the Vạn Thịnh Phát system. The complaints alleged that TVSI, SCB, and SCB sales staff engaged in fraudulent practices, misleading customers into buying bonds or switching their savings at SCB to purchase bonds from TVSI through various methods:

1. Misrepresentation of Products: Customers were not clearly informed about the nature of the bonds, instead being told they were a flexible savings option with high interest rates and liquidity, guaranteed by SCB.
2. Concealed Contracts: Customers were not allowed to review bond purchase agreements beforehand. Instead, they were instructed to transfer money to TVSI's account, and the contracts were provided for signature weeks later.

Flow of Funds After Bond Purchase

Once customers agreed to buy bonds:

• Bondholders transferred money to TVSI to purchase bonds.
• TVSI transferred the funds to primary bondholders or companies that repurchased bonds from primary bondholders.
• These companies then transferred the money to individuals under the guise of loan repayments or share purchases.
• These individuals withdrew the cash for their own use.

After TVSI transferred the funds, the perpetrators withdrew cash from SCB's Saigon, Bến Thành branch in two ways:

1. Direct Cash Withdrawal: Cash was withdrawn and handed over to Bùi Văn Dũng, Trương Mỹ Lan's driver, to be transported to her residence or designated locations. Alternatively, it could be directly handed over to Nguyễn Phương Hồng or individuals designated by her at the branch.
2. Withdrawals via Nominees: Hired individuals acted as nominees, signing withdrawal and deposit slips for designated accounts. In reality, no actual money was deposited or withdrawn. These funds were then transferred to other accounts for various purposes, such as repaying loans, settling credit card bills, or transferring to specific companies or individuals.

This method allowed the group to conceal the flow of funds from bond issuance activities and the beneficiaries of the bond sales.

The Vạn Thịnh Phát Financial Network

In parallel with its control over banks, Trương Mỹ Lan established an extremely complex financial ecosystem under the umbrella of Vạn Thịnh Phát Group. This network comprised over 1,000 domestic and international companies, subsidiaries, and affiliates, organized in multiple overlapping layers with hundreds of individuals acting as legal nominees, relatives, or employees of Vạn Thịnh Phát. The Vạn Thịnh Phát network was divided into four main functional groups operating in a coordinated, multi-tasking manner:

1. Domestic Financial Companies: These entities were responsible for withdrawing funds and providing capital, including SCB, TVSI, and Việt Vĩnh Phú Financial Investment Joint Stock Company. SCB served as the primary "money pump," channeling funds to other companies within the Vạn Thịnh Phát ecosystem.
2. Companies Operating in Vietnam: These were predominantly large companies in the real estate, restaurant, and hotel sectors, tasked with developing projects to attract investment capital.
3. Domestic Shell Companies: These were created as legal entities to borrow money from banks, contribute to debt-repayment projects, or enter into construction and cooperation contracts, making projects appear to be invested in by multiple reputable developers.
4. Foreign Companies in Tax Havens: These companies served a dual role of managing assets and capital, facilitating the family's overseas business activities, and presenting themselves as foreign investors when investing in Vietnam.

Through her operatives at SCB and within the Vạn Thịnh Phát ecosystem, Trương Mỹ Lan allegedly withdrew money from SCB under the guise of fraudulent loan applications. Most of Vạn Thịnh Phát's loans were disbursed before being legalized. Each withdrawn amount was allocated to specific subsidiaries to create shell companies, fabricate investment projects, and inflate the value of collateral. To facilitate processing by SCB's systems, this group used internal codes on documents, such as "HST" (Head Office Marketing) or "Project Plan," which indicated that the file belonged to the "husband's family" (referring to Trương Mỹ Lan's family).

To legitimize fund withdrawals, Trương Mỹ Lan's group established thousands of legal entities and hired thousands of individuals to act as legal representatives, signing loan applications and collateral documents. This network expanded continuously, requiring new nominees to conceal excessive credit exposure. To bypass the CIC system for credit checks, funds were channeled into shell companies and then circulated through other Vạn Thịnh Phát ecosystem companies, eventually being withdrawn as cash, thus severing the trail.

Furthermore, under Trương Mỹ Lan's direct instruction, Vạn Thịnh Phát group members colluded with SCB employees to conduct numerous illegal international money transfer transactions. This was achieved by creating fictitious contracts to legitimize the transfer of funds abroad or the receipt of funds into Vietnam, such as agreements for the purchase and sale of shares, capital contributions, loan agreements, and consulting contracts between Vietnamese companies and foreign entities, which were in reality related-party companies of Vạn Thịnh Phát. Notably, even though international transfers lacked necessary conditions or received funds from abroad lacked information on the purpose, and automated systems flagged these transactions, authorized individuals intervened to unblock the system and allow the transfers.

Complicity of Officials

To maintain such a vast operation for an extended period, Trương Mỹ Lan relied not only on her corporate ecosystem and fraudulent loan documents but crucially on the complicity of those who were supposed to oversee, inspect, and protect the national financial system. The case involved high-ranking officials from inspection agencies, banks, and valuation firms who allegedly facilitated the wrongdoing.

Most notably, Đỗ Thị Nhan, Director of Banking Supervision Department II of the State Bank of Vietnam and head of the SCB inspection team, received the largest bribe in the case: 5.2 million USD. Following her was Nguyễn Văn Hưng, former Deputy Chief Inspector in charge of the Banking Supervision Agency of the State Bank of Vietnam, who received 390,000 USD. Sixteen other members of the inspection team also received portions, ranging from 1,000 to 21,000 USD, along with other material gifts.

When preparing the SCB inspection report, Ms. Nhan allegedly instructed the team not to record accurate figures or the bank's dire financial situation, opting for vague statements to obscure SCB's wrongdoings. Significantly, when a member of the inspection team proposed placing SCB under special control, Mr. Hưng allegedly dismissed this recommendation. In the report on SCB's inspection results submitted to the Government, under the recommendations section, Ms. Nhan allegedly directed the drafting of a proposal for the Government to facilitate SCB's development of a restructuring plan.

Mysterious Deaths

Several individuals connected to the case died under suspicious circumstances. Nguyễn Phương Hồng died suddenly two days after her arrest, and Nguyễn Tiến Thành passed away mysteriously just before the case was exposed. These unexpected deaths prevented the investigation from reaching its full conclusion and suggest a complex network of vested interests lubricated by money.

The Illusion of Safety

Even the safest havens can be compromised. Before its exposure, Vạn Thịnh Phát Group had numerous indicators of economic irregularities, yet they were seemingly overlooked. These included alleged violations in the construction of the Vạn Thịnh Phát building, illegal land use at Nguyễn Du street, irregularities in SCB guarantees, involvement with two companies, Dream Republic and Shin Mega, that defaulted on thousands of billions of dong in the Thủ Thiêm land auction, and alleged connections to individuals with names similar to Vạn Thịnh Phát leaders in the Panama Papers. Trương Mỹ Lan and nine other family members had also applied to renounce their Vietnamese citizenship in 2014, only to withdraw their applications later.

Conclusion: A Financial Tragedy

The Vạn Thịnh Phát case has exposed a financial tragedy of an unprecedented scale. The victims were not individuals seeking quick profits through risky investments or stock market speculation. They were ordinary citizens with a simple desire to earn regular returns on their savings. This trust was systematically exploited. The deception targeted the most secure place in people's minds, as even a major bank could be used as a tool for a fraudulent scheme. This has not only caused material damage but has also eroded public trust in the financial system.

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