'No limits': Russia, China and US enter new nuclear arms race

Key Concepts

• New START Treaty: The last remaining major treaty limiting US and Russian nuclear forces, expiring February 5th, 2026, capping each side at 1,550 deployed strategic warheads.
• Strategic Deterrence: The concept of maintaining a nuclear arsenal to deter attacks against oneself and allies, including the ability to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation.
• Extended Deterrence: The ability of a nuclear power (like the US) to deter attacks against its allies by threatening retaliation against an aggressor.
• Nuclear Triad: The three components of a nuclear arsenal – ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers.
• Upload: Adding more warheads to existing missile systems.
• Novel Nuclear Systems: New Russian nuclear delivery systems (Poseidon torpedo, Burevestnik cruise missile) not covered by New START.
• Launch on Warning: A doctrine of launching nuclear weapons upon detection of an incoming attack.
• Doomsday Clock: A symbolic clock maintained by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, currently set at 85 seconds to midnight, indicating the perceived level of global nuclear threat.
• Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): An international treaty aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

The Expiration of New START and the Future of Nuclear Arms Control

The episode of “Battle Lines Global Health Security” focuses on the impending expiration of the New START treaty between the US and Russia on February 5th, 2026, and the implications for global security. This marks the first time since 1991 that there will be no formal limits on the nuclear arsenals of the world’s two largest nuclear powers, coinciding with China’s rapid nuclear buildup. The discussion centers on the drivers behind nuclear stockpiles, the potential for a new arms race, and the challenges of maintaining stability in a changing geopolitical landscape.

Drivers of Nuclear Stockpiles and Deterrence Strategies

Both the US and Russia currently possess significantly fewer nuclear weapons than during the Cold War, but still maintain substantial arsenals. Matthew Bun, Professor at Harvard Kennedy School, explained that the size of these arsenals is driven by a combination of strategic culture and perceived needs. For the US, these needs include deterring attacks on its territory and providing “extended deterrence” to allies in Europe and elsewhere. This extended deterrence relies on the credible threat of damage limitation strikes against an adversary’s nuclear capabilities and maintaining a survivable second-strike capability. Russia, similarly, views its nuclear arsenal as essential to its status as a leading world power and seeks parity with the US. Dario Dulakova, a senior research fellow at RUSI, highlighted Russia’s strategic culture, emphasizing its historical view of itself as a major global power requiring a comparable nuclear arsenal.

The Potential for a Nuclear Build-Up

With New START expiring, there is concern about a potential build-up of nuclear forces. Bun noted that the conversation in Washington is shifting from further reductions to how to increase US nuclear forces, potentially through “uploading” – adding more warheads to existing missiles. He acknowledged a minority view that damage limitation is not necessary or achievable, but the prevailing sentiment within the US strategic community favors a buildup. This is further fueled by China’s rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal, leading some to advocate for the ability to target both Russian and Chinese nuclear sites simultaneously.

Challenges to Arms Control in a Multipolar World

The expiration of New START is not simply a bilateral issue. The original arms control talks during the Cold War proved resilient despite East-West tensions. However, the current situation is complicated by China’s emergence as a major nuclear power. Attempts to create a trilateral agreement (US, Russia, China) have failed, with China arguing it has no reason to limit its forces while the US and Russia maintain significantly larger stockpiles. Furthermore, the proliferation of non-nuclear technologies – missile defenses, space capabilities, cyber warfare, and precision conventional weapons – adds complexity to assessing nuclear stability. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 further deteriorated US-Russian relations, leading to the suspension of strategic stability dialogue and the cessation of on-site inspections and data exchanges mandated by New START.

The Value of Arms Control and the Role of Deterrence

Bun emphasized that arms control is not about negotiating with allies but with adversaries, aiming to limit their forces and enhance one’s own security. Despite the current challenges, he pointed to the historical success of arms control in reducing the overall number of nuclear weapons and preventing proliferation. However, the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence is being questioned, particularly in the context of extended deterrence. The Ukraine conflict has raised doubts about the credibility of US commitments to defend its allies, leading some European nations to consider developing their own nuclear capabilities. Dulakova noted that the debate over whether nuclear weapons effectively deterred Russia’s actions in Ukraine will likely occupy scholars for decades.

Emerging Technologies and Future Risks

The discussion also touched upon the risks posed by emerging technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI). While AI can enhance military capabilities, concerns exist about relinquishing launch authority to machines or about AI accelerating the decision-making process in crisis situations. Bun advocated for abandoning “launch on warning” policies, arguing that decisions about nuclear use should be deliberate and carefully considered.

Russia’s Novel Nuclear Systems and Modernization Programs

Dulakova highlighted Russia’s development of “novel nuclear systems” – the Poseidon torpedo and Burevestnik cruise missile – which are not covered by New START. While these systems may be redundant to existing capabilities, they signal a perceived vulnerability in Russia’s strategic forces and a desire to evade potential US missile defenses. Both Russia and the US are undergoing nuclear modernization programs, which are costly and technically complex.

Conclusion

The expiration of New START represents a significant setback for global nuclear security. The combination of deteriorating US-Russian relations, China’s nuclear buildup, and the emergence of new technologies creates a dangerous environment. While a full-scale nuclear arms race is not inevitable, the risk of escalation is higher than it has been in decades. The episode underscores the urgent need for renewed diplomatic efforts to address these challenges and preserve the existing arms control architecture, even in a world characterized by mistrust and geopolitical competition. The panelists emphasized that arms control is a vital investment in security, particularly when dealing with adversaries, and that maintaining a stable nuclear balance requires careful consideration and proactive engagement.