NATO and Kremlin both conduct nuclear weapons drills | DW News

Key Concepts

• Nuclear Weapons Drills: Exercises conducted by military forces to practice procedures related to the authorization and potential use of nuclear weapons.
• Deterrence: A strategy aimed at preventing an adversary from taking a certain action by threatening retaliation.
• Dual-Capable Aircraft: Aircraft designed to carry both conventional and nuclear weapons.
• Steadfast Noon: NATO's annual nuclear deterrence exercise.
• Grom: Russia's annual nuclear exercise, typically overseen by Vladimir Putin.
• Abel Archer: A NATO exercise in 1983 that the Soviet Union misinterpreted as a potential first strike, highlighting the risks of miscalculation.
• Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE): An international organization that facilitates dialogue and cooperation on security issues, including military exercises.
• Nuclear Coercion: The use of nuclear threats to influence the behavior of other states.
• Red Lines: Boundaries or actions that a state declares will trigger a strong response, potentially including military action.

NATO's Annual Nuclear Drills: Steadfast Noon

Increased Transparency and Visibility

This year's NATO nuclear drills, codenamed "Steadfast Noon," were notable for their unprecedented transparency. For the first time, the exercise was conducted with journalists present, allowing for public observation of a typically top-secret mission. This openness is intended to enhance public understanding of the importance of NATO's nuclear deterrence capabilities and to reinforce the message of readiness.

Scale and Scope of the Exercise

• Participants: 14 NATO allies participated in the two-week mission.
• Aircraft: Over 70 aircraft were involved in the exercise.
• Location: The drills largely took place over the North Sea.
• Aircraft Capability: The exercise involved "dual-capable aircraft," meaning these planes can conduct both conventional and nuclear attacks. Multiple NATO countries possess such aircraft.

Strategic Messaging and Objectives

NATO's primary objective with this increased transparency is to send a clear message of deterrence. The drills aim to demonstrate that if an attack occurs, there will be a response. The intended audience for this message includes Russian President Vladimir Putin, but also, significantly, the populations on NATO's eastern flank. The exercise serves as a sign of support and reassurance, demonstrating NATO's capability and readiness to defend its allies.

Russia's Nuclear Weapons Drills

Concurrently with NATO's exercises, Russia conducted its own nuclear weapons drills. The Russian military stated these drills were designed to test the procedures for authorizing nuclear attacks. The exercise reportedly involved land, sea, and air-based launches, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

Expert Analysis and Perspectives

William Alberg's Assessment

William Alberg, a senior adjunct fellow at the Pacific Forum and former NATO official with expertise in weapons of mass destruction and arms control, offered his perspective on the current situation.

• Concern Level: Alberg expressed that the series of exercises between Russia and NATO does not cause him genuine concern. He characterized them as annual, routine exercises that have been ongoing for a considerable time. "Steadfast Noon" has been conducted since at least 2006, with predecessor exercises predating that. Russia's "Grom" exercise, overseen by Putin, also occurs annually in late October.
• Normal Signaling: He views these exercises as "normal signaling" aimed at ensuring deterrence is functioning correctly and that planning is proceeding as intended. He does not see them as a symptom of an immediate threat.
• Increased Transparency as a Key Change: While acknowledging the scale of this year's "Steadfast Noon" (14 countries, over 70 aircraft), Alberg highlighted transparency as the most significant change. He noted that in 2021, even mentioning "Steadfast Noon" was not permitted officially, making the current level of openness "truly extraordinary."
• Russia's Complaints: Alberg interprets Russia's complaints about NATO's drills, such as the Russian Foreign Ministry's statement about escalating strategic risks, as typical behavior aimed at probing for weaknesses in the alliance's resolve. He believes Russia's increased transparency makes them "a little bit more worried" and that they are attempting to "push us back." He advises against taking these complaints too seriously, describing them as a "bullying tactic."

Lessons from the Cold War and Risk Reduction

• Abel Archer Incident: Alberg referenced the 1983 NATO exercise "Abel Archer," which the Soviet Union mistook for preparations for a first strike. This incident led to heightened tensions and demonstrated the dangers of miscalculation.
• Mechanisms for Risk Reduction: Between the US and Russia, and NATO and Russia, Alberg believes significant lessons have been learned and implemented to reduce the risk of escalation. These include:
  • OSCE: The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe facilitates exchanges regarding military exercises.
  • Agreements on Prevention of Nuclear War: The US and Soviet Union negotiated agreements requiring notification of strategic exercises.
  • Ballistic Missile Agreements: The US and Russia notify each other before launching ballistic missiles.
• Notification of Tests vs. Attacks: Alberg emphasized that notification of missile tests is crucial, as it prevents them from being mistaken for an attack and allows for observation and preparation. However, an actual attack would likely not be preceded by notification.
• Concerns Regarding Other Nations: While confident in US-Russia and NATO-Russia mechanisms, Alberg expressed more concern about potential miscalculations between China, India, and Pakistan, as they lack similar established risk-reduction frameworks.

Nuclear Coercion and "Red Lines"

• Uncertainty of Russian Red Lines: Alberg stated that the specific "red lines" for Russia are unknown. He referenced Tom Schelling's concept of deterrence as "the threat that leaves something to chance," implying that ambiguity can be a component of deterrence.
• Putin's Use of Nuclear Coercion: Alberg characterized Putin's actions as an attempt at "nuclear coercion," using nuclear threats to alter the behavior of other states. He cited Russia's repeated declarations of "red lines" regarding military aid to Ukraine (artillery, tanks, missiles) as examples of this tactic.
• Effectiveness of Coercion: Alberg assessed that Russia's attempts at nuclear coercion have yielded mixed results. While they have sometimes delayed Western support for Ukraine and influenced some decisions, they have not fundamentally altered the core support. He identified the true "red line" as direct confrontation between NATO/US and Russia, a threshold that has not been crossed.
• Advice to Putin: Alberg encouraged Vladimir Putin to cease using these coercive signals, stating that they are "not as effective" and "just doesn't work."

Conclusion

The summary highlights a period of heightened nuclear signaling between Russia and NATO, characterized by simultaneous military exercises. While Russia conducted drills to test attack authorization procedures, NATO's "Steadfast Noon" exercise stood out for its increased transparency. Experts like William Alberg view these as routine deterrence signaling rather than immediate threats, emphasizing the established mechanisms for risk reduction between NATO and Russia. However, concerns remain regarding the potential for miscalculation with other nuclear powers and the ongoing use of nuclear coercion by Russia, which Alberg argues is ultimately ineffective. The core message from NATO is one of readiness and deterrence, aiming to prevent conflict through clear communication of capability and resolve.