Kaja Kallas: can the European Union survive in an era of strongmen?

Key Concepts

• China's Interest in Ukraine War: China's stated interest in the war in Ukraine is to prevent Russia from losing, as this would shift American focus towards China.
• Europe's Economic Leverage: Europe possesses significant economic leverage over China due to its importance as a market.
• China's Economic Coercion: China employs economic coercive practices, including export controls and manipulation of critical raw material supplies.
• European Unity and Divergent Views: European Union member states have divergent views on how to address China's economic coercion and support for Russia, largely due to varying levels of dependence on China.
• Partnership Building: A key strategy for Europe to counter China's influence is to build partnerships with Indo-Pacific, Latin American, and African nations to diversify supply chains.
• Power and Strength: The argument is made that China understands and respects power and strength, and that Europe needs to demonstrate its ability to impose pain to be taken seriously.
• Anti-Coercion Instrument: The EU has an instrument to retaliate against economic coercion, but its effectiveness is contingent on unity among member states.
• Hard Power vs. Economic Power: The discussion touches upon whether brute hard power and military might, as exemplified by leaders like Donald Trump, are becoming more influential than economic leverage in international relations.
• Predictability vs. Unpredictability: The contrast is drawn between Europe's emphasis on predictability and rule-setting versus the perceived unpredictability of strongman leaders like Trump, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin, which can be a source of power.
• China and Russia's Predictability: Despite the perception of unpredictability from some leaders, China and Russia are presented as highly predictable in their long-term strategic goals, as evidenced by statements from Putin and Xi Jinping.

China's Stance on the Ukraine War and its Strategic Interests

Representative Kaakalas shared an extraordinary conversation with Chinese Foreign Policy Chief Wang Yi regarding China's perspective on the war in Ukraine. Wang Yi conveyed that it is not in China's interest for Russia to lose the war. The rationale behind this statement is that if the war in Ukraine concludes, America's strategic attention would then pivot towards China. This suggests a calculated geopolitical maneuver by China, prioritizing its own security interests over the immediate cessation of conflict and its humanitarian consequences.

This perspective is contrasted with assessments from Japanese thinkers who suggest that the war in Ukraine is not particularly popular within China. They posit that China needs to justify its role as a "key enabler" of the war to its own populace, and Wang Yi's statement serves as a means to soften this narrative by framing it as being in China's national interest. The transcript highlights the stark implication of this stance: if sincerity is assumed, it suggests a willingness to accept the bombing of cities and civilian casualties for the sake of China's self-interest, painting a picture of a "ruthless great power."

Europe's Economic Leverage and its Limitations with China

The discussion then shifts to Europe's economic leverage over China. While Europe possesses significant economic power and a reputation for being a rule-setter and keeper, this leverage does not translate as effectively with China as one might expect. The transcript points out that despite Europe being a crucial market for China, when disputes arise with the United States, China can retaliate by restricting the supply of critical minerals like rare earths, leaving Europe as "collateral damage" with seemingly little power.

The core of this issue is identified as Europe's geopolitical power, which is contingent on unity among its member states. Two primary concerns regarding China are raised:

1. Economic Coercive Practices: This includes actions like export controls that negatively impact European economies and industries.
2. Support for Russia's War in Ukraine: China's role as a key enabler of the war is seen as causing significant harm to European economies.

The challenge lies in the divergent views among EU member states, with some being more dependent on China than others. This internal division hinders a unified and decisive response.

Strategies for Countering China's Influence

The proposed solution to this leverage deficit is to build partnerships around the world. The transcript argues that superpowers often overestimate their own power and underestimate the need for collaboration. Therefore, the key strategy is to foster diversified supply chains by building relationships with Indo-Pacific, Latin American, and African partners.

However, a counter-argument is presented: China understands power and strength, and responds to those who can impose pain. Europe possesses the ability to inflict economic pain, evidenced by the existence of an instrument designed to counter economic coercion. The critical factor for its effectiveness is unity among the 27 member states. The transcript notes that this instrument has never been used, and its potential application against China when its economy is being harmed is questioned.

The representative acknowledges that while Europe has the power and the tools, the problem lies in the lack of united application. The emphasis on partnerships is reiterated as a means to gain leverage by reducing dependence on China. The transcript highlights China's dominance in critical raw materials, electric batteries, ships, and electric vehicles, making many countries reliant on it. This reliance means that any action Europe takes must be backed by a clear understanding that the other party can also inflict pain, and that Europe has backup options.

The Role of Hard Power and Predictability in Geopolitics

The conversation then explores whether brute hard power and military might are becoming more influential than economic leverage. The example of Donald Trump's fondness for tariffs as a "super weapon" is cited. The question is posed whether Europe is being marginalized by great powers that effectively bundle hard power, coercion, and economic power.

The fundamental problem is identified as the contrast between autocratic decision-making (where leaders can take decisions via executive orders) and the democratic processes within the EU, which involve 27 member states with diverse domestic issues and lengthy debates. This makes it harder for Europe to act decisively and quickly.

The transcript then delves into the concept of predictability. Europe's strength lies in its predictability and adherence to rules. However, leaders like Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin are characterized as "strongmen" whose unpredictability can be a source of power.

Interestingly, the transcript then argues that China and Russia are, in fact, very predictable. Putin's goals were made clear in 2007, and he has been open about them. Similarly, Xi Jinping's statement to Putin about shaping changes together, with neither country's rise being subject to unforeseen circumstances, indicates a shared, predictable long-term vision. The challenge, according to the transcript, is not their predictability, but rather whether Western leaders believe them, as they tend to interpret actions through a "democratic lens" rather than understanding the strategic calculus of these leaders. The war's commencement, for instance, surprised many leaders who did not believe it was possible, highlighting a disconnect in understanding. The evolution of these geopolitical dynamics is ultimately seen as being influenced by the actions and perceptions of those involved.