How to fight Russia in war – exclusive footage from Ukraine | The Security Brief

Key Concepts

• European Funding for Ukraine: A 90 billion euro loan to cover costs until 2027, not exclusively for defense.
• National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA): US defense bill providing 800 million USD over two years for Ukraine and the Baltics, also imposing restrictions on US troop withdrawals from Europe.
• Drone Warfare: The significant threat posed by various types of drones, including fiber optic drones and one-way attack drones (Shahed 136 style, Russian Garand 2).
• Fiber Optic Drones: Drones with a 30 km range, controlled via a physical cable, making them immune to RF jamming.
• One-Way Attack Drones (Shahed 136 / Garand 2): Iranian-designed, Russian-produced drones, traveling at ~120 mph with variable warheads (up to 90 kg), increasingly equipped with aphid air-to-air missiles.
• Ukrainian Adaptation Tactics: Innovative methods developed by Ukraine to counter drone threats using limited resources, often dismissed by NATO.
• MI17 Assault Helicopter: A ubiquitous Russian-made helicopter adapted by Ukraine for anti-drone operations.
• Tracer Rounds: Ammunition that illuminates bullets, used by door gunners on MI17s to target drones.
• Electro-optic Camera: A high-resolution camera used for drone detection and targeting, particularly effective in areas with "cultural lighting" (city lights) where thermal cameras might struggle with contrast.
• Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) Cameras: Thermal imaging cameras crucial for long-range drone detection and tracking, especially at night.
• Alibaba Procurement: Ukraine's strategy of sourcing critical, denied equipment (like FLIR cameras) from open-source commercial platforms.

European Funding for Ukraine

European leaders have agreed to a 90 billion euro loan for Ukraine, intended to cover various costs until 2027. This funding is not solely for defense but also addresses economic pressures, energy infrastructure targeting, civilian population support, and humanitarian components. This amount falls 50 billion euros short of Ukraine's initial request.

To illustrate the scale of defense spending, an example was given: Ukraine's agreement with Sweden for 100 to 150 Jazz 39 Griffin fighter jets. At an average cost of 45 million euros per jet, acquiring 150 jets would amount to approximately 7 billion euros, a significant portion of the 90 billion euro total. The critical aspect of this funding, however, lies in procuring specialized "kit" that Ukraine needs to design and generate to counter the main threats: drones and ballistic missiles. This involves not just traditional industrial bases but also new defense tech startups producing cost-effective, critical equipment.

US Defense Bill and NATO Implications

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) was signed, allocating 800 million USD over two years for Ukraine and the Baltics. A notable feature of this act is its restriction on a US President's ability to withdraw from NATO, specifically by setting a minimum threshold of 76,000 US troops in Europe. This provision is seen as "clipping Donald Trump's wings" regarding potential disengagement from NATO. The key question remains whether this funding will facilitate the critical defense equipment Ukraine needs.

The Drone Threat and Ukrainian Adaptation

The most significant threat discussed is the "relentless attacks by drones." A specific incident highlighted was a Friday night attack involving 653 drones and 51 ballistic missiles. Ukraine successfully neutralized 90% of these (shooting down 585 drones and 30 missiles), but the remaining 10% still hit 29 locations deep within Ukraine, demonstrating the persistent danger even with high interception rates. These drones are becoming increasingly advanced, incorporating fiber optics and AI.

Two primary types of drones were detailed:

1. Fiber Optic Drones:

   • Have a 30 km range.
   • Used by both Russian and Ukrainian troops in close combat.
   • Controlled via a small physical cable, making them immune to radio frequency (RF) jamming.
   • Russians are observed landing these drones near potential targets to conserve battery life, making them harder to detect before activation.

2. One-Way Attack Drones (Shahed 136 style / Garand 2):

   • Pioneered by Iran (Shahed 136), with blueprints provided to Russia for mass production (Russian name: Garand 2).
   • Not particularly sophisticated, traveling at approximately 120 mph.
   • Carry a variable warhead in the front, up to around 90 kg, with heavier warheads reducing range.
   • Increasingly being equipped with aphid air-to-air missiles, posing an additional threat to Ukrainian air capabilities attempting to intercept them.

Tactics for Countering Drones

Ukraine has developed "extraordinary" and "rudimentary" tactics, "breaking the rule book" to counter these drones with available capabilities.

• MI17 Helicopter Operations:

  • Ukrainian MI17 assault helicopters are used to intercept drones.
  • Door gunners use machine guns with tracer rounds to target drones. Tracer rounds illuminate the bullets, aiding accuracy, especially at night.
  • Pilots must approach drones from behind, as the MI17's maximum speed of 150 mph only provides a 30 mph overtake on a 120 mph drone, requiring precise interception.

• Advanced Detection and Targeting:

  • Electro-optic cameras are used for detailed visual targeting, particularly effective over cities where "cultural lighting" (city lights) makes thermal cameras less effective due to contrast issues.
  • Footage from Odessa showed an MI17 targeting a Garand 2 drone flying at a very low altitude (estimated 30-50 feet above rooftops). A powerful spot lamp was used to illuminate the drone.
  • The drone was tracked across the city and then targeted and destroyed over a non-urbanized, wooded area to minimize risk to those on the ground.
  • Pilots receive real-time data on elevation, camera pointing angle, and heading from the electro-optic camera.

• Limitations of Basic Equipment:

  • Without specialized kit, targeting drones at night is extremely difficult, relying on tracer rounds alone, as demonstrated by footage showing minimal visibility.
  • Night vision goggles are not very effective against drones at night, especially outside urban areas.
  • Forward-looking infrared (FLIR) cameras are crucial for extending detection and tracking range from hundreds of meters to kilometers, providing earlier identification and a better firing solution.

Challenges and NATO's Role

A significant challenge is the lack of readily available critical kit. A Ukrainian military commander recounted being denied forward-looking infrared (FLIR) capability by a "significant NATO country" for bolting onto helicopters. The idea was dismissed as "crazy" and unworkable.

In response to this denial, Ukraine resorted to purchasing these cameras from Alibaba (the Chinese equivalent of Amazon). Since August 2024, using these commercially sourced cameras, Ukrainian forces have shot down 5,000 drones.

This highlights a critical disconnect:

• Ukrainian ideas and capabilities, developed "on the hoof" and proven highly effective, are being dismissed by NATO and European countries.
• NATO and European countries are "not up to speed" with these innovative tactics.
• The lack of support in these critical areas forces Ukraine to source equipment from open-source markets.

The speaker argues that the "intellectual property, intelligence, experience, and tactics, training and procedures" developed by Ukraine are critical information that NATO and European countries should respect and learn from. With NATO leaders discussing preparing for war, these Ukrainian counter-tactics are invaluable for developing defenses should Russia expand its aggression beyond Ukrainian territory. The deployment of Arashnik missiles into Belarus is cited as a "combat indicator" that this problem is not going away.

Conclusion

The video underscores Ukraine's remarkable resilience and ingenuity in adapting to the relentless threat of drone warfare with limited resources. Despite receiving substantial financial aid, the critical need for specific, advanced equipment often goes unmet by traditional NATO channels, forcing Ukraine to innovate and source solutions independently. The success of these "poor cousin" tactics, such as using MI17 helicopters with commercially sourced FLIR cameras to shoot down thousands of drones, presents invaluable lessons for NATO and European countries. The speaker emphasizes that dismissing these hard-won experiences is a missed opportunity for Western defense preparedness, especially as the threat of wider conflict looms.