How strong is the Russian army?

Key Concepts

• Defense Attaché: A military officer assigned to an embassy to represent their country's armed forces and gather intelligence.
• FSB (Federal Security Service): Russia's principal security agency and successor to the KGB.
• Deterrence: The act of discouraging an action or event through instilling doubt or fear of the consequences.
• Hubris: Excessive pride or self-confidence.
• Chauvinism: Excessive or prejudiced loyalty or support for a particular cause, group, or sex.
• Racism: Prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism directed against someone of a different race based on the belief that one's own race is superior.
• New Generation Warfare: A concept involving indirect methods like espionage, sabotage, and destabilization operations, often aiming to achieve objectives without large-scale conventional military engagement.
• Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs): A combined arms unit in the Russian military, designed to be a self-sufficient fighting force.
• NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): A military alliance of 32 member states.

Meeting with Russian Generals: A Failed Deterrent

John Foreman, former British Defense Attaché in Moscow, recounts a critical meeting in the lead-up to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace and Chief of Defense Staff Sir Tony Radakin met with their Russian counterparts, Sergey Shoygu and Valery Gerasimov, in an attempt to deter an invasion. Foreman was present, observing the exchange.

• Context: The meeting was arranged with only two weeks' notice, amidst mounting intelligence indicating an imminent Russian invasion. It was a last-ditch effort to dissuade Russia from attacking.
• Objective: The British delegation aimed to speak directly with Shoygu and Gerasimov, who were known to meet with President Putin, to bypass intermediaries and convey their message directly.
• Atmosphere and Demeanor: Foreman describes the initial atmosphere as "stuffy." Shoygu, perceived as vain, began by reading a prepared statement. The British side sought to refute Russian talking points and emphasize the potential negative consequences of an invasion for Europe, Ukraine, and Russia, while also offering bilateral and multilateral avenues to stabilize relations.
• The "Carrot": The discussion touched upon demands issued by Russia in late 2021 regarding European security, with the British side indicating which of these demands might be negotiable.
• Perceived Deception: Foreman, fluent in Russian, listened to the tone and language used by the Russian generals. He concluded that they were either "Champions League liars" or genuinely unaware of Putin's final decision. He notes that the subsequent actions, such as Britain sending more defensive weapons to Ukraine, indicated they saw through the Russian assurances.
• Foreman's Assessment of Russian Knowledge: While the British delegation was hopeful, Foreman believes Shoygu and Gerasimov likely knew about the invasion plans. However, he speculates that the final "go" decision from Putin might not have been made until around Valentine's Day (February 14th), shortly before the invasion commenced on February 24th. This suggests that while planning was advanced, the ultimate authorization was still pending.

Russian Military Strengths and Weaknesses: A Catastrophic Failure

Foreman analyzes the Russian army's performance in Ukraine, drawing on his observations of exercises, military journals, and academic discussions. He attributes the failures not solely to a bad plan but to a fundamental rot within the army's culture and proficiency.

• Underestimation and Overestimation: The Russian military underestimated the Ukrainians and overestimated their own capabilities.
• Hubris, Chauvinism, and Racism: Foreman identifies a significant role for hubris, chauvinism, and racism in the Russian mindset. Ukrainians were viewed as "lesser people," "little Russians," and "country bumpkins," contrasting with the self-perception of Russians as the "great Russian people" and heirs to figures like Zhukov.
• Concept of "New Generation Warfare": The Russian strategy seemed to incorporate elements of "new generation warfare," focusing on indirect methods like espionage, sabotage, and destabilization to achieve a swift collapse of Ukrainian power. The belief was that by attacking key nodes and undermining the country through subversion, Ukraine would crumble, its leadership would flee, and a puppet regime could be installed.
• Flaws in the Plan and Intelligence:
  • Conceptual Flaws: The plan itself had inherent problems.
  • Intelligence Failures: The intelligence services, particularly the FSB, were criticized for "kicking information up" that Putin wanted to hear, rather than delivering bad news. Reports of troop unpreparedness, lack of rehearsals, insufficient troop numbers, and Ukrainian resistance were likely suppressed.
• Execution Failures:
  • Multiple Parallel Thrusts: The invasion involved four simultaneous thrusts into Ukraine without a unified command structure.
  • Logistical Deficiencies: There was a severe lack of logistical planning and preparation.
  • Lack of Rehearsals: Troops on the border were reportedly unprepared, with outdated maps and no clear plans when ordered to advance.
• Catastrophic State Failure: Foreman characterizes the invasion's outcome as a "catastrophic failure of the Russian state," indicative of how corruption and incompetence have eroded institutions like the army and Ministry of Defense.

The Future of the Russian Army: A Look Backwards

Foreman discusses potential future directions for the Russian army, considering the possibility of a ceasefire and rebuilding efforts. He argues against simplistic Western forecasts that focus solely on tank production numbers.

• Two Potential Models:
  • Lean, Modernized Army: A smaller, professional force focused on lethal firepower, similar to NATO armies.
  • Soviet-Style Mass Army: A large force built around vast numbers of personnel.
• Russian Army's 2022 State: Foreman contends that the Russian army in 2022 was neither a lean, professional force nor a true Soviet-style mass army. The Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) represented an attempt at a more modern, albeit flawed, structure.
• Inability to Think About War While at War: A key challenge for Russia is its inability to strategize for future conflicts while actively engaged in the current one.
• Defensive Posture and Looking to the Past: Foreman anticipates a continued defensive posture for the Russian army, with a tendency to draw lessons from its past.
• Mistakes in Western Forecasting: Western analyses often overlook the "intent" behind Russia's military build-up. Simply calculating production numbers without considering Russia's strategic objectives can lead to inaccurate predictions.
• Emphasis on Nuclear Weapons: Given Russia's declining economic and military standing relative to Europe, and the ongoing rebuilding of its conventional forces (which Foreman describes as a "rabble"), Putin's directions are likely to place a greater emphasis on nuclear weapons.
• Growing Economic and Military Gap: The economic gap between Russia and Europe is expected to widen. European defense spending is projected to increase significantly (to 2.5-3.5% of GDP), potentially adding trillions of dollars over the next decade. This contrasts with Russia's struggling economy, which must simultaneously rebuild its army.
• NATO's Superiority: Foreman asserts that even a European-only NATO, let alone one with American participation, would be capable of handling the Russian army, especially after Russia's severe losses in Ukraine and facing a significantly stronger adversary.
• Conclusion on Future Russian Army: The future Russian army is likely to resemble past iterations: strong on paper but primarily serving as a deterrent to keep external threats at bay, a symbol of institutions weakened by corruption and incompetence.