How an Assad-era law is threatening Syrian civil society | DW News

Key Concepts

• Law 93 (1958): Syrian law granting the regime broad powers to control civil society organizations.
• NOS (Non-Governmental Organizations): Organizations operating independently of government, often focused on humanitarian aid, human rights, or development.
• Reoccupation of Control Mechanisms: The continuation of Assad-era repressive systems under new leadership (ex-rebels and Islamist hardliners).
• Centralized Control Infrastructure: The network of laws and institutions used to maintain power through surveillance and restriction.

The Persistence of Repressive Structures in Syria

The video details how, despite the decline of the Assad regime, the mechanisms of control it established in Syria remain largely intact. The core argument is that while the personnel in power have changed – shifting from Assad loyalists to ex-rebels and Islamist hardliners – the systems of repression have been “reoccupied” rather than dismantled. This results in a continuation of restrictions on civil society.

Law 93: A Legacy of Control

A central focus is Law 93, enacted in 1958. This law, utilized extensively by Hafez al-Assad during his rule and subsequently inherited by his son Bashar al-Assad, provided the legal framework for suppressing independent organizations. Specifically, Law 93 allowed authorities to “monitor, restrict, and dissolve” any group perceived as a potential challenge to the regime. This encompassed a wide range of entities, including “human rights groups, charities, women’s rights organizations, [and] anyone with independent influence.”

The video highlights that current reporting from NOS’s (Non-Governmental Organizations) reveals patterns mirroring those under the old regime. These patterns include “arbitrary bans,” “last-minute cancellations” of programs, and interference in the hiring processes of these organizations. This demonstrates that the law is still actively being used to exert control.

The New Rulers, the Same Tools

The shift in power to ex-rebels and Islamist hardliners hasn’t resulted in a liberalization of these controls. Instead, these new authorities are utilizing the existing “centralized control infrastructure” – the network of laws and institutions – to consolidate their own power. The video emphasizes that these frameworks, originally designed to “crush opposition” under Assad, now grant the new rulers “the same unchecked authority under a new banner.” This illustrates a critical point: the problem isn’t simply who holds power, but the structure of power itself.

Limited Reforms and Potential Regression

While some NOS’s have managed to navigate the registration process, the video cautions that these “small reforms” are insufficient. The organizations themselves express concern that a lack of “large-scale reforms” could inadvertently lead to a worsening of the situation, effectively “taking them backwards.” This suggests that superficial changes without addressing the underlying legal and institutional structures are unlikely to create genuine space for civil society.

Data & Evidence

The video relies on reports from NOS’s operating in Syria as its primary source of evidence. These reports detail the continuation of repressive practices, specifically the patterns of arbitrary bans and interference in organizational operations. The longevity of Law 93 – being “on the books since 1958” – is presented as a key fact demonstrating the enduring nature of these control mechanisms.

Synthesis

The video’s central takeaway is that the fall of the Assad regime hasn’t automatically translated into freedom or a flourishing civil society in Syria. The repressive systems engineered by the Assads remain operational, now wielded by a new set of actors. This “reoccupation of control mechanisms” underscores the importance of addressing the underlying legal and institutional structures that enable repression, rather than simply focusing on changes in leadership. The situation highlights the fragility of reforms and the potential for regression if systemic changes are not prioritized.