From the archives: President Nixon makes "silent majority" speech on Nov. 3, 1969

Key Concepts

• Vietnamization: A policy shift in US foreign policy aimed at transferring the responsibility of fighting the war to South Vietnamese forces, supported by US training and equipment.
• Nixon Doctrine: A foreign policy principle emphasizing that the United States will keep its treaty commitments, provide a nuclear shield, and offer military and economic assistance, but the threatened nation must assume primary responsibility for its own defense.
• Precipitate Withdrawal: The immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all US forces, which the President argued would be disastrous.
• Negotiated Settlement: The pursuit of peace through diplomatic means, including proposals for withdrawal of all outside forces, a supervised ceasefire, and free elections.
• Great Silent Majority: A term used by the President to refer to the segment of the American population that supports his policies but does not actively demonstrate.
• Honorable End to the War: The President's stated goal, which involves ending the war in a way that preserves American credibility and avoids a humiliating defeat.

President Nixon's Address on the Vietnam War

Introduction and Context

CBS News White House correspondent Dan Rather introduced President Nixon's address from the Oval Office, noting the unusual advance announcement of the speech. The timing was significant, coinciding with the anniversary of the US bombing halt in North Vietnam, falling between domestic anti-war demonstrations, and preceding important off-year elections.

President Nixon's Address

1. The Problem of Division and Loss of Confidence: President Nixon began by acknowledging the deep divisions within the American populace regarding the Vietnam War and the public's loss of confidence in government information about the policy. He stated the necessity of informing the American people truthfully about the war to gain their support.

2. Key Questions Addressed: The President outlined the core questions he intended to answer:

• How and why did America become involved in Vietnam?
• How has his administration changed previous policies?
• What has happened in negotiations and on the battlefield?
• What are the available choices for ending the war?
• What are the prospects for peace?

3. The Situation Upon Inauguration (January 20): Nixon described the dire situation he inherited:

• The war had been ongoing for four years.
• 31,000 Americans had been killed in action.
• The South Vietnamese training program was behind schedule.
• 540,000 American troops were in Vietnam with no reduction plans.
• No progress had been made in Paris negotiations, and no comprehensive peace proposal had been presented by the US.
• The war was causing deep domestic divisions and international criticism.

4. Rejection of Immediate Withdrawal: Nixon revealed that some advisors urged immediate withdrawal, which he acknowledged would have been politically popular and easy. However, he felt a greater obligation to consider the long-term implications for future generations and global peace and freedom. He framed the central question not as "Johnson's war vs. Nixon's war" but as "how can we win America's peace?"

5. Historical Context of US Involvement:

• 15 years prior: North Vietnam, with support from China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose communism on South Vietnam.
• Response to South Vietnam's request: President Eisenhower provided economic aid and military equipment.
• 7 years prior: President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel as combat advisors.
• 4 years prior: President Johnson sent American combat forces. Nixon acknowledged criticism of President Johnson's decision and the conduct of the war but emphasized the current challenge: how to best end the war now that the US was involved.

6. Consequences of Precipitate Withdrawal: Nixon argued that an immediate withdrawal would be a disaster for:

• South Vietnam: Leading to communist massacres similar to those in North Vietnam (over 50,000 killed, hundreds of thousands in labor camps) and a prelude seen in Hue (3,000 civilians killed during a brief communist rule). This would particularly affect the 1.5 million Catholic refugees from the North.
• The United States: Resulting in a collapse of confidence in American leadership globally, especially in Asia.
• The Cause of Peace: Promoting recklessness among great powers with expansionist goals, potentially sparking violence in other regions (Middle East, Berlin, Western Hemisphere), and ultimately costing more lives.

7. US Presidents' Stance on Vietnam: Nixon cited Presidents Kennedy, Eisenhower, and Johnson as recognizing the stakes and the need for continued effort. He quoted President Kennedy: "We want to see a stable government there, carrying on the struggle to maintain its national independence. We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort."

8. The Nixon Administration's Peace Initiatives: Nixon outlined his administration's multi-pronged approach to ending the war:

• Negotiating Front:

  • Public Proposals: Detailed peace proposals presented in a May 14th television speech and at the UN, including:
    • Complete withdrawal of all outside forces within one year.
    • Ceasefire under international supervision.
    • Free elections under international supervision, with communist participation.
    • The Saigon government's pledge to accept election results.
  • Flexibility: Stated willingness to discuss proposals from the other side, with the only non-negotiable being the right of South Vietnamese self-determination.
  • Paris Peace Conference: Ambassador Lodge demonstrated flexibility in 40 public meetings.
  • Hanoi's Stance: Refusal to discuss US proposals, demanding unconditional US withdrawal and the overthrow of the South Vietnamese government.
  • Private and Secret Initiatives:
    • Early Offers: Two private offers for a rapid settlement made soon after his election through an intermediary with North Vietnamese leaders. Hanoi's response was described as a call for US surrender.
    • Soviet Union Engagement: Meetings with Soviet representatives to enlist their assistance in starting meaningful negotiations, as the USSR supplied most of North Vietnam's military equipment.
    • Discussions with Other Governments: Extended discussions with nations having diplomatic relations with North Vietnam.
    • Personal Letter to Ho Chi Minh (Mid-July): Sent through an individual who knew Ho Chi Minh personally, outside diplomatic channels, hoping to bypass propaganda and achieve progress. The letter expressed a desire for a "just peace" and a willingness to be "forthcoming and open-minded."
    • Ho Chi Minh's Reply (August 30): Received three days before Ho's death, it reiterated North Vietnam's public position and flatly rejected the initiative.
    • Private Sessions in Paris: Ambassador Lodge held 11 private meetings with North Vietnam's chief negotiator.
    • Secret Initiatives: Other significant initiatives kept secret to maintain communication channels.
  • Summary of Negotiation Progress: "No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table."
  • Attribution of Obstacle: The obstacle is Hanoi's refusal to negotiate seriously, convinced they can wait for further US concessions.

• Battlefront (Vietnamization):

  • The Nixon Doctrine: A shift in US foreign policy, described at Guam on July 25th, to prevent future Vietnams. The principle is to help nations fight their own wars rather than fighting for them.
  • Three Principles of the Nixon Doctrine for Asia:
    1. The US will keep all treaty commitments.
    2. The US will provide a nuclear shield against nuclear threats to allies or vital nations.
    3. For other types of aggression, the US will provide military and economic assistance but expects the threatened nation to provide the primary manpower for its defense.
  • Vietnamization Plan: Launched after Secretary Laird's visit in March.
    • Increased Training and Equipment: Substantial increase for South Vietnamese forces.
    • Shift in Troop Mission: General Abrams' orders changed to focus on enabling South Vietnamese forces to assume full responsibility for security.
    • Reduced Air Operations: Over 20% reduction.
  • Results of Vietnamization:
    • Troop Withdrawals: Over 60,000 men to be withdrawn by December 15th, including 20% of combat forces.
    • Strengthening of South Vietnamese Forces: They are increasingly taking over combat responsibilities.
    • Reduced Enemy Infiltration: Less than 20% of the previous year's level over the last three months.
    • Declining US Casualties: Lowest point in three years over the last two months.

9. Program for the Future:

• Complete Withdrawal of US Ground Forces: On an orderly, scheduled timetable, in cooperation with the South Vietnamese.
• Withdrawal from Strength: The rate of withdrawal will increase as South Vietnamese forces strengthen.
• No Fixed Timetable Announcement: Reasons include:
  • Removing incentive for the enemy to negotiate.
  • The rate of withdrawal depends on developments in Paris talks, enemy activity, and South Vietnamese training progress.
• Optimistic Timetable: Progress has been greater than anticipated, making the withdrawal timetable more optimistic than initial June estimates.
• Cautionary Note: A significant increase in enemy activity might necessitate adjusting the timetable.
• Clear Statement on Enemy Action: If infiltration or casualties increase while US forces are scaling down, it will be a conscious decision by the enemy. Hanoi would err if it assumed increased violence would be advantageous.
• Commander-in-Chief's Responsibility: If increased enemy action jeopardizes US forces, strong and effective measures will be taken.

10. Two Choices for Ending the War:

• Choice 1: Immediate, precipitate withdrawal without regard to consequences.
• Choice 2: Persist in seeking a just peace through negotiation or Vietnamization, withdrawing forces on a schedule as South Vietnamese forces become capable of defending their freedom. Nixon stated he had chosen the second course, calling it "the right way."

11. Consequences of the Chosen Path:

• Ending the War: The plan will end the war and serve the cause of peace globally.
• Avoiding Loss of Confidence: Prevents allies from losing confidence in America and, more importantly, Americans from losing confidence in themselves.
• Avoiding Remorse and Recrimination: Rejects the "easy way out" to avoid future national scarring.
• National Greatness: America's greatness lies in its capacity to do what is right, even when difficult.

12. Addressing Disagreement and Demonstrations: Nixon acknowledged that some citizens disagree with his plan, but as President, he cannot allow policy to be dictated by a minority imposing their views through demonstrations. He emphasized that US policy is made by elected leaders under the Constitution.

13. Message to Young People: He expressed respect for their idealism and shared concern for peace. He highlighted the personal toll of the war, signing 83 letters to grieving families that week, and his desire to end the war to save lives and redirect their energy towards positive challenges.

14. Patriotism and National Destiny: Nixon invoked patriotism and national destiny, stating that America's strength and wealth place it in a position where its people's moral stamina and courage are crucial for the survival of peace and freedom worldwide. He urged against allowing "the last hopes for peace and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism."

15. Appeal to the "Great Silent Majority": He asked for their support, reiterating his campaign pledge to end the war and win the peace. He stressed that domestic division weakens the US and makes the enemy less likely to negotiate. He called for unity for peace and against defeat, stating, "North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that."

16. Conclusion and Vision: Nixon referenced Woodrow Wilson's dream of ending wars, acknowledging that the Vietnam War is not that war. However, he asserted his plan will bring the world closer to the goal of a "just and lasting peace," a dedication shared by all US presidents. He pledged to meet his responsibility with all his strength and wisdom.

Post-Address Analysis by CBS News

Dan Rather: Summarized the major points: adoption of a plan for US ground troop withdrawal, refusal to commit to a fixed timetable, rejection of immediate withdrawal, and disclosure of secret peace attempts, including the letter to Ho Chi Minh.

Marvin Kalb (Diplomatic Correspondent):

• Judgment: The speech "cut no new ground," was a "soft-spoken, straight in the eye restatement of policy."
• Target Audience: Aimed at the "great silent majority," not the anti-war "core of impudent snobs."
• Criticisms: Those unwilling to trust the President would note the absence of a new troop withdrawal announcement or a definite timetable.
• Ho Chi Minh Letter: Suggested the President's interpretation of Ho Chi Minh's letter as a "flat rejection" might be debatable, as it contained "some of the softest, most accommodating language found in a communist document."
• Policy Summary: "A negotiated settlement, presumably in Paris if possible, Vietnamization if necessary."
• Paris Talks Threat: A veiled threat to change or break up the Paris talks if the communists continued to refuse serious negotiation.

Eric Sevareid (National Correspondent):

• Gut Reaction: An appeal for unity and support for the President, done in a "low-key but very fervent manner."
• Lack of Newness: No substantial or dramatic new announcements. The President is "standing his ground."
• No Ceasefire or Fixed Timetable: No ceasefire, no public fixed timetable for withdrawal, no new troop withdrawal contingent announced.
• Request for Trust: Asking for trust and flexibility.
• Impact on Critics: Unlikely to appease critics like Senator Fulbright; they would likely continue their criticism.
• Potential for Future Announcements: A feeling that more troop withdrawal announcements might come before mid-November demonstrations, though without evidence.
• Philosophical Stance: Similar to Johnson/Rusk, adopting the "freedom is indivisible" and "test case" notions of global importance.
• Illogic: A perceived profound illogic in seeking to "win" the war without seeking military victory.

Marvin Kalb on North Vietnamese/Viet Cong Reaction:

• The President "has not given them anything terribly new to chew on."
• The President was primarily addressing the American people, not the North Vietnamese.
• The President's negative judgment of the Ho Chi Minh letter might be problematic, as Ho Chi Minh is a revered figure, and the letter contained potentially flexible language.

Final Exchange on "Winnable" War:

• Eric Sevareid: Agrees the President is trying to avoid an "outright open, humiliating loss."
• Marvin Kalb: Agrees completely, noting the President fears the domestic impact of losing as much as the international implications.

Dan Rather's Closing: Concluded by emphasizing the President's statement that only Americans can defeat or humiliate the US.