Former deputy NATO chief: Chinese build-up, not treaty expiration, driving proliferation concerns

Key Concepts

• New START Treaty: A bilateral treaty between the United States and Russia limiting strategic nuclear weapons. It expired in February 2026.
• Nuclear Deterrence: The concept of discouraging an attack by possessing the capability to retaliate with devastating force.
• Extended Deterrence: The commitment by a nuclear power to defend its allies by using its nuclear weapons if necessary.
• Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): An international treaty aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
• Proliferation: The spread of nuclear weapons to new countries or actors.
• Assured Retaliation: A nuclear doctrine emphasizing the ability to launch a devastating counterattack even after absorbing a first strike.
• P5: The five permanent members of the UN Security Council with nuclear weapons: United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, and France.

The Future of Nuclear Deterrence: A Discussion with Rose Gottemoeller

Introduction & The End of New START

The discussion centers on the implications of the expiration of the New START treaty between the United States and Russia, and the evolving landscape of nuclear deterrence. Rose Gottemoeller, former Deputy Secretary General of NATO and a New START negotiator, expresses a philosophical outlook on the treaty’s end, noting it was legally set to expire on February 5th, 2026. She voiced disappointment that President Trump didn’t accept President Putin’s offer for a one-year extension to allow the US time to prepare for dealing with China’s growing nuclear capabilities.

The Rising Threat of China & Proliferation Drivers

A primary concern is China’s rapid nuclear buildup. Gottemoeller highlights that China has increased its nuclear warhead stockpile from approximately 300 to 600 in recent years, with projections estimating 1,500 warheads by 2035 (according to Department of Defense estimates). While still significantly less than the 4,000+ warheads held by the US and Russia, the pace of this buildup is alarming. This growth fuels proliferation concerns, as other nations may feel compelled to acquire nuclear weapons to counter a potential future with two dominant nuclear powers (US and China). Geopolitical tensions in Europe and Asia, coupled with uncertainty about continued US commitment, also contribute to this drive.

Global Nuclear Arsenals: A Comparative Overview

The five nuclear weapons states recognized under the NPT – the US, Russia, China, UK, and France – currently hold the vast majority of nuclear weapons. The US and Russia each deploy 1,550 weapons under New START, with total stockpiles exceeding 4,000. China is rapidly increasing its arsenal, while the UK and France possess significantly smaller numbers, ranging from 150 to 250 warheads.

Ambitions & the P5 Dynamic

The discussion shifts to the ambitions of these nuclear powers. While all NPT-recognized states officially support non-proliferation, China’s buildup is creating pressure on the US to potentially increase its deployed weapons. Gottemoeller acknowledges the possibility of a Russian buildup as well, given their capacity to quickly add more warheads to their missiles. This creates internal pressures within the P5 to expand their nuclear arsenals.

The Trump Administration & Potential for Negotiation

Gottemoeller discusses the Trump administration’s initial negative stance towards New START, but notes a subsequent agreement, reportedly brokered by Jared Kushner and Steve Witoff, to maintain the treaty’s limits while pursuing a new agreement. She views this as a positive step and expresses optimism about the current administration’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, citing the dedication of President Biden and Vice President Harris.

Russia’s Response & Potential for Dialogue

Regarding Russia’s potential response, Gottemoeller notes their recent statements indicating they will refrain from building up their arsenal if the US adheres to New START limits. This provides a foundation for potential negotiations.

European Concerns & the US Nuclear Umbrella

The conversation turns to European anxieties about the reliability of the US nuclear umbrella, particularly given President Trump’s past questioning of commitments to allies. Gottemoeller emphasizes that extended nuclear deterrence is a “mind game” – creating doubt in an adversary’s mind about the risks of attack. She highlights the importance of continued NATO exercises, such as Steadfast Noon, to demonstrate strength and cooperation. However, she clarifies that these exercises primarily involve US nuclear weapons and European aircraft practicing procedures for their use.

European Nuclear Deterrence: A Debate

The discussion addresses the possibility of European nations developing their own independent nuclear deterrents. Gottemoeller strongly advises against this, arguing it would be destabilizing and financially burdensome, especially considering Europe’s existing commitments to conventional defense and social welfare programs. She notes that France, already a nuclear power, is considering extending its deterrent, but cautions against non-nuclear states like Germany pursuing similar paths. She points out that the UK and France, through their doctrine of “assured retaliation,” have successfully deterred Russia for decades without needing numerical parity.

France’s Role & Capacity

Gottemoeller clarifies that France’s potential extension of its nuclear deterrent is a decision within its existing status as a nuclear weapon state under the NPT, not a new proliferation effort. She reiterates that the UK and France do not need to match Russia’s arsenal to maintain a credible deterrent, emphasizing the importance of resolve and allied support.

Looking Ahead: Expectations for the Next Months

Gottemoeller anticipates ongoing negotiations between the US and Russia, based on recent signals from Vice President Harris and the Kushner/Witoff team. She stresses the need for expertise in these negotiations, drawing on experienced weapons systems operators and former inspectors.

Conclusion

The discussion paints a complex picture of the current nuclear landscape. The expiration of New START, coupled with China’s rapid buildup and uncertainties surrounding US commitment, creates a volatile environment. While potential for dialogue exists with Russia, the key to maintaining stability lies in continued diplomacy, demonstrating the strength of extended deterrence, and resisting the temptation for further proliferation. Gottemoeller’s insights underscore the importance of strategic thinking, expert engagement, and a commitment to arms control in navigating these unpredictable times.