Fears of ethnic cleansing after Sudan's El-Fasher falls to paramilitaries • FRANCE 24 English

Key Concepts

Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF): The official military of Sudan, established in 1956.
Rapid Support Forces (RSF): A paramilitary group that grew out of the Janjaweed militia, formally organized in 2013.
Janjaweed: An Arab majority armed group from eastern Chad and Darfur, used by Omar al-Bashir's government in 2003.
Omar al-Bashir: Former Sudanese president who led a coup in 1989 and was overthrown in 2019.
Transitional Sovereign Council: A governing body established after Bashir's overthrow, composed of military and civilian representatives.
Alfasare: A city in Darfur, recently captured by the RSF.
Darfur: A region in western Sudan that has experienced significant conflict.
Quad Group: A US-led initiative involving the UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to mediate the conflict.
Chapter 7 Mandate: Refers to UN Security Council resolutions that can authorize the use of force to maintain international peace and security.

The Escalation of Violence in Sudan and its Complex Roots

The transcript details the ongoing conflict in Sudan, highlighting a recent atrocity in Alfasare, Darfur, where paramilitary fighters of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have reportedly killed and detained hundreds of civilians since taking full control of the city. This event underscores the escalating violence and the rising risk of ethnically motivated atrocities, as stated by the UN, which is calling for safe passage for trapped civilians.

The war, which began in April 2023, stems from simmering tensions between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF. These two entities, which previously operated together, are now engaged in a bloody civil war, each supported by various armed groups.

Historical Context of the Waring Factions

Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF): Established in 1956 upon Sudan's independence, the SAF is estimated to have around 200,000 active personnel. Following Omar al-Bashir's 1989 coup, the military became deeply integrated into Sudan's economy, controlling natural resources like oil fields, gold mines, and agricultural land.
Rapid Support Forces (RSF): The RSF evolved from the Janjaweed, an Arab majority armed group from eastern Chad and Darfur. The Janjaweed were instrumental in the government's 2003 crackdown on a rebellion in Darfur, a conflict that resulted in an estimated 300,000 deaths and over 2 million displaced persons. With Bashir's backing, the militia was formally organized under the RSF banner in 2013 and later legitimized as an independent security force by a 2017 law. The RSF is believed to have approximately 100,000 troops and is led by Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemeti.

The Path to Conflict: Post-Bashir Power Struggle

Despite previously being hired by Bashir for protection, the RSF joined forces with the SAF in 2019 to overthrow him after months of protests against his nearly three-decade rule. Subsequently, the military and pro-democracy movements established a Transitional Sovereign Council. Hemeti was appointed its deputy head, while army general Abdel Fattah al-Burhan led it. Disagreements between these two leaders regarding the country's direction and the integration of the RSF into the army, coupled with their apparent desire to retain power, ultimately led to the outbreak of fighting in April 2023, though the instigator of the first shot remains disputed.

The Complexity and Lack of Global Attention

John Posil, an associate professor at Coventry University's Centre for Peace and Security, discusses the reasons behind the conflict's limited global attention compared to other wars like those in Gaza and Ukraine. He attributes this to the inherent complexity of the Sudanese conflict. Unlike situations with two clearly defined opposing sides (e.g., Israel and Palestine, or Russia and Ukraine), Sudan's conflict involves multiple actors and intricate regional dynamics, making it difficult for international actors to easily take sides or generate widespread sympathy.

Posil argues that the core of the conflict lies in the "failed transition process" after the revolution against Bashir and the inability to effectively "bind the military back to the barracks" and demilitarize a state heavily influenced by the military complex, including its economic dominance.

Regional Interference and the Limits of Mediation

The transcript highlights the significant role of regional powers in fueling the conflict. Posil identifies the United Arab Emirates as a primary supporter of the RSF, providing daily assistance. Egypt is noted for its support of the SAF, with Iran, Russia, and Turkey also involved to varying degrees, alongside Saudi Arabia. Neighboring countries like Chad are also politically involved.

Posil emphasizes that the effectiveness of international mediation efforts is hampered by the lack of accompanying "political substance." He argues that the key to stopping the fighting lies in halting regional support, particularly the substantial backing from the UAE to the RSF. As long as this support continues, neither side has a strong incentive to cease hostilities.

Obstacles to Peace and Potential Scenarios

The capture of Alfasare by the RSF has emboldened them, freeing up an estimated 20,000 troops who can now be deployed elsewhere, thus diminishing the RSF's interest in a ceasefire. While international efforts are underway, including the US-established "Quad group" (comprising the US, UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia) and ongoing discussions in Washington D.C. with the US Special Envoy, the lack of meaningful political negotiations is a significant impediment.

A major point of contention is the Quad group's call for a transitional civilian government that excludes both the army and the RSF. Posil explains that this was a primary trigger for the 2017 military coup and the current war. The military factions, under pressure from Islamist groups and driven by their own economic and political interests, are unwilling to relinquish power. Representatives close to the SAF have indicated a willingness to stop the war and accept a transitional government only if the RSF is excluded and their own interests are represented, which is a non-starter for other parties. This presents the central dilemma: how to remove the military from power.

The Marginalization of Civil Society

Posil also points out that civil society has been largely sidelined in mediation efforts. He suggests that the recent polarization of the conflict, where both SAF and RSF have aligned with smaller militias and political forces, has left little space for civil society in political negotiations. However, the atrocities witnessed and the potential weakening of RSF militia support after the fall of Alfasare might lead to a dismantling of these blocs, potentially creating a more flexible situation.

The Diminishing Prospects for Peacekeeping

Regarding the applicability of lessons learned from peacekeeping efforts elsewhere, Posil notes that peacekeeping is currently not a popular concept. The US administration has reduced its involvement in peacebuilding, and there have been significant reductions in peacekeeping missions in South Sudan and a lack of funding in Somalia. This raises questions about who would fund peacekeeping operations if they were to be deployed in Sudan.

Posil outlines two potential scenarios for Sudan:

Libya Model: Freezing the current front lines, leading to the establishment of two separate administrations.
Renewed Escalation: Given the ongoing fighting in Kordofan and other areas, a more likely scenario is a renewed escalation, potentially including a counterattack on Khartoum, which is currently under SAF control.

In the current climate, a Chapter 7 mandated peacekeeping mission, which would involve hard means, is unlikely to be sanctioned by the Security Council.