Exclusive: The first proof of the use of chemical weapons in Sudan’s civil war • FRANCE 24

Key Concepts

• Chemical Weapons: The use of toxic substances as weapons in warfare.
• Chlorine Gas: A dangerous industrial chemical, toxic when inhaled, and capable of causing skin burns and eye irritation. It is also commonly used for water purification.
• Rapid Support Forces (RSF): A militia that rose up against the Sudanese army in 2023, initiating Sudan's civil war.
• Sudanese Army: The official military force of Sudan, engaged in conflict with the RSF.
• Gary Military Base: A military installation north of Khartoum, near Sudan's largest oil refinery.
• Al Jailei Oil Refinery: Sudan's largest oil refinery, located near the Gary Military Base.
• Ports Engineering Company: A Sudanese company that imports supplies, including military items, and is headed by Colonel Anus Ununice.
• C4 ADS: A US-based NGO that tracks illicit shipments.
• Satellite Imagery: Used to confirm the location and timing of events.
• Ballistics Experts: Specialists who analyze the trajectory and impact of projectiles.

Evidence of Chemical Weapon Use in Sudan's Civil War

This report details the first evidence of chemical weapon use in Sudan's civil war, specifically involving chlorine gas. The evidence points to the Sudanese army as the likely perpetrator.

Incident at Gary Military Base and Al Jailei Refinery

• Date: September 2024
• Location: Gary Military Base, north of Khartoum, approximately 5 km from the Al Jailei oil refinery.
• Context: The base and refinery were under the control of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), who were engaged in daily fighting with the Sudanese army attempting to retake the refinery.
• Evidence:
  • A metal canister, identified as routinely used for storing and shipping large quantities of chlorine gas.
  • RSF fighters reported the presence of a "yellow gas" in the canister.
  • Another video shows a yellow cloud over the RSF camp.
  • Eight days later, another barrel was dropped, which RSF propaganda channels claimed was on the refinery.
  • Satellite imagery confirmed these videos were filmed within the refinery grounds, near its clinic.
  • Workers in the uniform of the Khartoum Refinery Company (KRC) were visible in the videos.
  • An engineer present at the time confirmed the incident but indicated no fatalities or long-term injuries.
  • Ballistics experts concluded that damage to the barrels was consistent with being dropped from an aircraft.

Sudanese Army's Aircraft Capability

• Fact: Only the Sudanese army possesses aircraft capable of performing such drops, suggesting their involvement in the incident.

Tracking the Chlorine Canisters

• Serial Number: A deciphered serial number on a canister led to a document revealing its origin and shipment details.
• Contents: The canister was filled with liquid chlorine.
• Origin and Shipment:
  • Loading Date: July 14th, 2024
  • Loading Location: Near Mumbai, India
  • Initial Vessel: RC Ocean, carrying 16 other canisters.
  • Intended Destination: Saudi Arabia
  • Transshipment Vessel: Al Ahmed
  • Arrival Port: Port Sudan, the provisional capital of the Sudanese army-led government.
  • Recipient: Ports Engineering Company, a Sudanese company.

Ports Engineering Company and its Role

• Head: Colonel Anus Ununice.
• Specialization: Public construction.
• Supplier's Statement: The Indian company that supplied the canisters stated that Ports Engineering Company claimed the chlorine would be used for water purification.
• Dual Use of Chlorine: Chlorine gas is widely used for water treatment, making its diversion for weaponization difficult to prevent. A single cylinder can chlorinate millions of liters of drinking water.
• Illicit Shipments: Commercial data from C4 ADS indicates Ports Engineering Company is known to import military supplies to Sudan.
  • Examples: Over $1 million worth of Indonesian-made military boots and thousands of Turkish-made ammunition belts and boxes.
• Link to Sudanese Armed Forces: C4 ADS discovered that Ports Engineering Company's majority shareholdership is directed towards the Sudanese armed forces, and one of its directors is a colonel in the army.
• Conclusion by C4 ADS: Ports Engineering Company is "very likely linked to staff military supply chains" and is part of an effort by the Sudanese armed forces to "obfuscate their shipments" to continue arming themselves.

Ambiguity of Chlorine Canister Imports

• Total Imports: Ports Engineering Company has imported at least 125 chlorine canisters since the beginning of the war.
• Unanswered Questions: It remains unclear whether these canisters were imported for water purification or for use as a weapon by the army.
• Lack of Response: The Sudanese army, Ports Engineering Company, and the Sudanese government did not respond to requests for information regarding the purpose and use of these canisters.

Synthesis/Conclusion

The evidence presented strongly suggests the use of chlorine gas as a chemical weapon by the Sudanese army during the ongoing civil war. The incident at the Gary Military Base and Al Jailei refinery, coupled with the tracking of chlorine canister imports through Ports Engineering Company, which has documented links to the Sudanese armed forces, points towards a deliberate act of weaponization. While chlorine has legitimate industrial and water purification uses, its procurement and the circumstances of its deployment in a conflict zone raise serious concerns about its misuse as a weapon of war. The lack of response from relevant Sudanese authorities further exacerbates the opacity surrounding these events.