Europe is mobilising to face Russia. Is the UK falling behind?

Key Concepts

• Strategic Autonomy: Europe's ability to act independently of Washington, particularly in defense matters.
• Military Mass: The importance of having a large number of personnel in the armed forces, a lesson from the Ukraine war.
• Citizen Soldier: The concept of military service as a civic duty, rooted in French revolutionary ideals.
• Hybrid Warfare: Conflicts involving conventional military action, irregular tactics, and cyber warfare.
• Total Defense: A comprehensive approach to national security involving all sectors of society, as practiced by Finland.
• Echelons of Force: The concept of multiple layers of military personnel (regular, reserve, etc.) to reconstitute an army during prolonged conflict.
• Human Material: A term used to describe the personnel available for military service, emphasizing the need for effective assessment and utilization.

France's New Voluntary Military Service Scheme

Main Topics and Key Points:

• Announcement: French President Emmanuel Macron announced a plan to boost the French armed forces through a new voluntary military service scheme.
• Nature of the Scheme: It is a voluntary scheme but is seen as a significant step towards potential future mandatory conscription in case of an emergency.
• Numbers and Timeline: The scheme aims to reach 3,000 participants by next year and expand to 50,000 by 2035.
• Three-Tier Structure: The proposed structure for the French army includes professionals, reservists, and volunteers.
• Context: The initiative is driven by the war in Ukraine and the perceived threat from Russia.
• Macron's Vision: The scheme aligns with Macron's concept of "strategic autonomy" for Europe, aiming for independence from Washington in defense.
• Rhetoric: A notable aspect is the rhetoric surrounding the scheme, including the suggestion by General Fabian Mandor that France must be psychologically prepared to lose children in a future war with Russia and that the nation lacks the "de Gaul spirit" to endure hardship for national defense.

Supporting Evidence/Arguments:

• James Crisp notes that the scheme "paves the way to potential conscription, mandatory conscription in the future if there was an emergency."
• Crisp links Macron's push for this to his vision of "strategic autonomy," where Europe, led by France, acts independently of Washington.
• The offering of the French nuclear shield ("forrap") to Germany and other EU countries is cited as an example of Macron trying to build blocks for future European security.

European Defense Readiness and the UK's Position

Main Topics and Key Points:

• European Armies: Most European armies are described as "a shadow of their former selves," with the UK's being "particularly woeful."
• Mass vs. Professionalism: The Russian invasion of Ukraine highlighted the continued importance of "military mass," challenging the trend towards all-professional armies.
• UK's Reluctance: The UK government has historically been reluctant to take steps that would gather data for conscription or even discuss youth volunteer national service. This is attributed to a desire to keep the use of armed force as an option for government independent of public engagement.
• Psychological Impact of Invasion: The transcript emphasizes the profound psychological impact of being invaded twice in two generations on countries like France, contrasting it with the UK's experience. Lithuanians and Estonians are noted to have experienced the end of WWII in 1991.
• Cultural Differences: A cultural shift towards greater defense readiness is seen as more likely in France than in Germany, partly due to historical context.
• Germany's Plans: Germany has plans for voluntary conscription, but stationing troops in Eastern Europe is problematic due to the legacy of Nazi Germany. Germany is also increasing its military budget and troop numbers.
• Poland's Stance: Poland, bordering Ukraine, is described as having the largest military in Europe with a goal of 300,000 troops and a major defense training program that includes marksmanship in schools.
• UK's Aversion to Conscription: The public in the UK has a strong aversion to conscription, associating it with the "mass slaughter of my children," a sentiment reminiscent of pre-WWII pacifism.

Supporting Evidence/Arguments:

• James Crisp states, "most European armies are a shadow of their former selves, and the UK's is particularly woeful."
• Dr. Lynette Nusbacher explains the UK's historical preference for a professional army that can be used as a "tool of statecraftraft" without needing public consensus.
• Nusbacher highlights the "deep-seated psychological differences" between Britain and continental Europe due to the experience of invasion.
• James Crisp mentions that Germany has a new military service plan requiring 18-year-old men to fill out questionnaires and undergo medical screening from 2027.
• Crisp notes Poland's goal of 300,000 troops and their defense training program including marksmanship in schools.
• The transcript cites public sentiment in England where the response to national service suggestions was "I don't want my children sent off to die in a foreign field."

The Role of Reserves and the Israeli Model

Main Topics and Key Points:

• Professional vs. Reserve Army: The discussion contrasts the ideal of an all-professional army with the necessity of a reserve force, especially in long, grinding wars.
• British Army's Preference: The professional British Army is uncomfortable with the idea of a reserve force augmenting the regular army, as it takes operational control away from professionals. Their ideal ratio is "100 and nil" (regular to reserve).
• Israeli Model: Israel's approach to generating force is presented as a model where the regular army crafts and trains conscripts who become future reservists.
• Israeli System: Conscripts (17-18 year olds) are assessed and assigned roles for decades, serving as conscripts, then reservists, and eventually older reservists. They can be mobilized in hours.
• Echelons of Force (Israeli Example):
  • First Echelon: Conscripts trained by regulars and older conscripts.
  • Mobilization: Released into the economy but can be mobilized quickly.
  • Role Progression: As they age, they shift to depth or training tasks, eventually losing reserve commitment in their 30s and 40s unless they have specialist skills.
• British Army's Approach vs. Israeli: The British Army uses its reserve force to augment its regular force, whereas the Israelis use their regular force to generate their reserve force for operations.
• Reasons for Israeli Model: Israel's model is driven by the need to generate a large army from a small population, facing multiple land borders and significant threats.
• Lessons for the UK: The UK could learn from Israel's method of assessing an entire generation of young people for their best contributions, free from class structures.

Supporting Evidence/Arguments:

• Dr. Lynette Nusbacher states, "The British Army seeks to be a regular army that is willing to be augmented every now and again by a very small number of reserveists."
• Nusbacher explains the Israeli system: "Israeli conscripts are there in order to be future reserveists."
• The transcript notes that British officers, after learning about the Israeli system, felt the Israelis had "got the cart before the horse" and that the British army "could not even start to generate force the way that the Israelis do."
• Nusbacher emphasizes the Israeli practice of assessing "an entire generation of humans of human material and assess them for what they can do best."

The Evolving Nature of Warfare and Future Preparedness

Main Topics and Key Points:

• Shift in Warfare: The nature of warfare is changing, with a move towards AI, autonomous systems, and combat in the information space.
• "World War 3.0": This term is used to describe the current conflicts, including Ukraine, Israel-Iran, and information warfare.
• Future Combat: Future wars are expected to involve more AI, autonomous combat systems, and "flying killer robots."
• Information Space Vulnerability: The UK is seen as particularly vulnerable to combat in the information space, with Russian influence on social media and politics.
• Finland's Total Defense: Finland's model of "total defense" is presented as a comprehensive, whole-of-society approach to national security, involving conscription, reserves, and regional forces.
• Understanding the Enemy: A clear understanding of the threat, as demonstrated by Finland's understanding of Russian doctrine, is crucial.
• UK's Lack of Clear National Interests: A key problem identified for the UK is the lack of a "sharp idea of our vital national interests," making it difficult to determine what is worth fighting for.
• Government's Reluctance to Define Interests: British governments are seen as preferring the "luxury of being able to blow with the wind" rather than clearly defining national interests.
• Need for Skill Development: The government needs to ensure the creation of skill sets and understanding for future reservists and regulars, particularly in areas like drone operation and repair.
• Implementation Paralysis: The UK state is described as "paralyzed in our approach to implementation," hindering the ability to develop necessary skills and personnel.

Supporting Evidence/Arguments:

• Dr. Lynette Nusbacher describes the current conflicts as "World War 3.0" and foresees future wars with "a lot more artificial intelligence... with a lot more autonomy in our combat systems with flying killer robots."
• Nusbacher states, "one of the things that we are just showing ourselves to be utterly unfit to deal with is combat in the information space."
• James Crisp mentions Finland's "concept of total defense" and their "whole of society approach."
• Nusbacher argues that the Finns have a "clear understanding of what threat they're trying to deal with" and understand "Russian doctrine."
• Nusbacher asserts, "The problem that we have in the United Kingdom... is that we don't have a sharp idea of our vital national interests."
• Nusbacher points out the difficulty in implementing strategies due to "paralyzed" state implementation and a reluctance to guide young people's career paths.

The Debate on Mass vs. Technology in Warfare

Main Topics and Key Points:

• Historical Perspective: Experts 15-20 years ago believed mass was no longer important, emphasizing electronics and speed.
• Ukraine War's Reversal: The 2022 conflict in Ukraine demonstrated the continued importance of "heavy metal warfare," including tanks, artillery, and infantry.
• Killing and Destruction: Mass remains important because "killing and destruction is the currency of warfare."
• Force Multipliers: The Ukrainian defense highlights how mass can be augmented by "force multipliers" like drones and autonomous systems.
• Changing Definition of Mass: The use of drones and independent autonomous systems by Ukrainian soldiers changes the concept of what "mass" means in warfare.
• Ukrainian Mobilization: Ukraine has held back from mobilizing its youngest conscripts for social reasons, leading to a generation of experienced individuals in their 20s who have used advanced technologies.
• AI and Mechanization: James Crisp questions if AI and mechanization mean fewer people are needed, rather than more.
• Optimizing Human Material: The French Revolution's approach to "optimizing the use of human material" is brought up as a historical precedent for efficient utilization of people.

Supporting Evidence/Arguments:

• Dr. Lynette Nusbacher states, "mass is always important because killing and destruction is the currency of warfare."
• Nusbacher notes that in Ukraine, "lightly held sectors of defensive systems... are being defended by Ukrainian soldiers heavily augmented by unstaffed systems."
• Nusbacher explains that this means "the mass does not only come in the mass mobilization of human material."
• James Crisp asks, "I mean, isn't the whole point of AI and all of this mechanization that you need fewer people, not more?"

Conclusion and Synthesis

The discussion highlights a significant shift in European defense thinking, spurred by the war in Ukraine and a perceived resurgence of Russian aggression. France's introduction of a voluntary military service scheme, while not conscription, signals a move towards greater national defense readiness and aligns with President Macron's vision of European "strategic autonomy." This contrasts with the UK's historical aversion to conscription and its preference for a professional, deployable military.

Key arguments revolve around the enduring importance of "military mass" in conventional warfare, as demonstrated by Ukraine, while acknowledging the evolving landscape of "hybrid warfare" and the increasing role of technology like AI and drones. The Israeli model of generating a large reserve force from a young conscript pool is presented as a potential, albeit challenging, lesson for Western armies.

A central theme is the psychological and cultural differences between continental Europe, with its direct experience of invasion, and the UK, which has historically been protected by its geography and navy. The UK's lack of a clearly defined set of "vital national interests" is identified as a significant impediment to developing a coherent defense strategy and public buy-in for any form of national service.

Ultimately, the conversation underscores the complex challenges of modern defense, requiring not only investment in technology and personnel but also a fundamental societal and political will to prepare for potential future conflicts, which may increasingly occur in the information space as well as on the physical battlefield. The need to effectively assess and utilize "human material" and adapt to new forms of warfare, while overcoming historical and cultural barriers, is paramount for European security.