Does Iran’s flip-flop on closing the Strait of Hormuz reveal a rift?

Key Concepts

• IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps): The primary military force in Iran, currently identified as the central power broker coordinating governance.
• Strait of Hormuz: A critical maritime chokepoint; its status (open vs. closed) is used by Iran as a tool of geopolitical leverage.
• Chain of Succession: A strategic framework implemented by the Iranian leadership to ensure institutional continuity following the assassination of senior officials.
• Comprehensive-minus Deal: An Iranian negotiating strategy seeking broad sanctions relief in exchange for limited concessions on nuclear issues.
• Opaque Governance: The lack of transparency in Iran’s decision-making, exacerbated by wartime conditions and the need for operational security.

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1. Governance and Power Dynamics

The Iranian political system is characterized by high opacity, which has intensified during the current conflict. While the IRGC retains overall control, it coordinates with various power centers. There is no single "authoritative" voice; instead, different entities communicate with specific audiences:

• Foreign Ministry: Targets international audiences and the U.S. government.
• IRGC/Military: Targets global markets, shipping industries, and the regime’s domestic hardline base.
• Parliamentary Leadership: Figures like Muhammad Ali (Speaker of Parliament) act as bridges between civilian governance and military networks, attempting to build consensus for negotiations.

2. Leadership Succession and Wartime Adjustments

Following the "12-day war" and subsequent targeted assassinations, Iran established a three-to-five-deep chain of succession for sensitive security and political roles. This ensures that if a leader is killed, the institution remains functional.

• Impact on Coordination: The need for operational security (to prevent further assassinations) has forced a reduction in communication between power centers, leading to a breakdown in internal coordination.
• The Case of Moshtaba: The successor to the Supreme Leader has been conspicuously absent from public view. Experts suggest this is likely due to security protocols, potential facial injuries sustained during strikes, or physical incapacitation, rather than a simple choice to remain camera-shy.

3. Public Sentiment and Social Base

• Hardline Base: Approximately 10–15% of the population remains supportive of the regime.
• The Majority: Most of the population is described as "ambivalent." While they dislike the disruption caused by the war, they do not necessarily rally behind the regime, as the government has failed to provide solutions to fundamental economic and social crises.
• Information Control: The regime has effectively stifled dissent by shutting down the internet, making it difficult to gauge the true scale of public opposition.

4. Negotiating Frameworks and Strategy

The conflict between the U.S. and Iran is currently stalled due to a misalignment of objectives:

• U.S. Position: Seeks either a limited deal (reopening the Strait of Hormuz for minor asset unfreezing) or a comprehensive deal (addressing nuclear, missile, and proxy issues).
• Iranian Position: Prefers a "comprehensive-minus" deal. They believe that by maintaining control over the Strait of Hormuz, they hold sufficient leverage to demand broad sanctions relief while offering only limited nuclear concessions.
• Consensus Building: The large size of the Iranian delegation at recent talks indicates an attempt to ensure "buy-in" from various internal power centers, though this often leads to a lack of agility at the negotiating table.

5. Notable Quotes

• Farzan Sabet on the nature of Iranian messaging: "In practice, what these different power centers are doing is communicating to different audiences."
• Sabet on the current state of negotiations: "The consensus that exists in Iran probably does not sufficiently overlap with the US position to unlock a deal."
• Sabet on Iran’s perception of leverage: "They think this is probably their maximum point of leverage... they think they hold the cards."

6. Synthesis and Conclusion

The Iranian state is currently operating under a decentralized, survival-oriented structure where the IRGC holds the ultimate edge. The regime is attempting to leverage its control over the Strait of Hormuz to secure a favorable economic deal while simultaneously managing internal fractures and the physical loss of leadership. The ceasefire is likely to be extended, not necessarily due to an imminent breakthrough in negotiations, but because both the U.S. and Iran require time—the U.S. for military prepositioning and Iran to maintain its perceived position of strength. The "too many cooks" dynamic within Tehran remains the primary obstacle to a cohesive, actionable foreign policy.