Are we facing a new nuclear arms race? - The Global Jigsaw podcast, BBC World Service

Key Concepts

• Budapest Memorandum: International security assurances for Ukraine in exchange for nuclear disarmament.
• NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty): International treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and promote peaceful nuclear energy.
• Nuclear Fuel Cycle: The entire process from mining uranium to its disposal, including processing, enrichment, and use for energy.
• Fatwa: A binding religious ruling in Islamic law.
• AMAD Programme: Iran's alleged clandestine nuclear weapons programme until 2003.
• JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action): The Iran nuclear deal, aimed at limiting Iran's nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.
• Nuclear Latency: The theoretical capability to produce a nuclear weapon without actually possessing one.
• Nuclear Hedging: The strategic wielding of nuclear latency to exert influence.
• Dark Fleet: A shadow system of transit tankers used by China to export Iranian oil, circumventing sanctions.
• Begin Doctrine: Israel's policy of carrying out pre-emptive strikes against countries perceived as developing weapons intended for use against it, particularly nuclear weapons.
• Gold Standard for Nuclear Non-Proliferation: The condition that a country does not enrich uranium domestically.
• CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty): A treaty prohibiting all nuclear weapons tests.
• Snapback Mechanism: A provision in the JCPOA allowing E3 countries (UK, Germany, France) to unilaterally reimpose UN sanctions on Iran if it violates the deal.
• Axis of Resistance: Iran's network of proxies in the Middle East.

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Global Security Landscape and Ukraine's Precedent

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 profoundly reshaped the global security landscape, reigniting Cold War-era fears of a new nuclear arms race. Ukraine serves as a critical example for Iranian media, highlighting the perceived benefits of a nuclear program. After the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, independent Ukraine inherited the world's third-largest nuclear arsenal. Under the Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine relinquished its nuclear arms in exchange for international security guarantees from Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom, which ultimately failed to protect it from attack. For Iranian media, this is a cautionary tale of a sovereign nation exposing itself to aggression by abandoning its nuclear deterrence for "meaningless international guarantees."

Iran's Nuclear Journey: From Shah to Sanctions

Iran's nuclear ambitions trace back to the 1950s under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, a pro-Western leader. His justifications for pursuing nuclear power, similar to those of oil-rich nations like Saudi Arabia today, included the finite nature of fossil fuels and the desire for international prestige as part of the "nuclear club." This involved achieving autonomy over the full nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mining to enrichment and disposal. The US, concerned about proliferation, imposed conditions on reactor sales. The Shah's rhetoric, mirroring that of the current Islamic Republic, emphasized Iran's "right to nuclear power" as a signatory to the NPT, specifically justifying uranium enrichment. While Iran has consistently stressed its program is for peaceful purposes, the Shah was the only Iranian leader to briefly claim a desire for nuclear weapons.

Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was vehemently opposed to nuclear weapons, deeming them "un-Islamic" and issuing a fatwa forbidding their development, even during the Iran-Iraq war (1983). This ideological stance had a material impact, as Iraq's continued use of chemical weapons forced Iran to "drink the poison chalice" and sue for peace in 1988. This opposition continued under Supreme Leader Khamenei, who formalized the ban with a binding religious ruling. Despite this, Western suspicions and IAEA doubts persisted, fueled by reports of the AMAD programme, a clandestine nuclear weapons program that lasted until 2003, where factions within Iran actively considered developing nuclear weapons as a deterrent.

The 2003 US invasion of Iraq, launched in pursuit of Saddam Hussein's alleged WMDs (which proved elusive), deeply impacted Iran. The fear of invasion became "very real" for Iran's establishment. In response, Iran voluntarily suspended uranium enrichment in 2003 to engage in negotiations. Khamenei's official fatwa against nuclear weapons was issued in 2005, amidst diplomatic wrangling where Iran asserted its NPT-backed right to develop nuclear energy.

The JCPOA, US Withdrawal, and Escalation

Since 2005, there has been a shift in Iran's nuclear doctrine, with media, officials, and MPs advocating for change. The recent Iran-Israel war (June 2025), the first direct attack on Iranian soil since 1988, revived "existential fears" within the Islamic Republic, leading to renewed calls for a nuclear deterrent.

The JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), or Iran deal, achieved low-level uranium enrichment (3.67%, the minimum for nuclear energy) under the world's most supervised nuclear program. This was seen by Iran as asserting its power, securing a peaceful nuclear program, and gaining sanctions relief and international prestige. However, in 2018, President Donald Trump withdrew the US from the JCPOA, calling it "defective at its core" and warning that Iran would be "on the cusp of acquiring the world's most dangerous weapons." Without meaningful US Treasury involvement, sanctions relief became "meaningless."

Following the US withdrawal, Iran began "open, very theatrical, escalating announcements" of uranium enrichment. While the deal capped enrichment at 3.67%, and 90% is needed for a weapon, Iran reached approximately 60% enrichment, largely under IAEA supervision. Tehran's strategy was to force the US back to the negotiating table and compel European powers into concessions, understanding that the "fear of the US Treasury" keeps the international system in check.

IAEA Condemnation and the Iran-Israel War

In June 2025, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution finding Iran in non-compliance with its nuclear safeguard obligations for the first time since 2005. The resolution stated Iran had stockpiled 400 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium, estimated to be enough for nine nuclear weapons. This condemnation occurred the day before Israel launched attacks on Iran's nuclear infrastructure. For Iran's hardliners, this situation presented an irony: they believed that if they had actual nuclear weapons, they would not have been attacked, fueling calls for a change in nuclear doctrine.

The concept of nuclear latency (theoretical capability without actual weapons) and nuclear hedging (strategically wielding this latency) is crucial here. Iran's "halfway position" of pursuing these without an actual weapon is seen as having failed. The US and European powers are now "adamantly opposed" to Iran enriching uranium on its own soil, making enrichment the "new red line."

Iran faces severe domestic electricity issues, with blackouts and government office shutdowns, despite being a major oil and gas producer (much of which is exported, even under sanctions). Nuclear power could address this imbalance. China is Iran's biggest customer, using a "dark fleet" of tankers to circumvent sanctions. Iran has also expanded relations with Russia, Central Asia, and India through forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS. Russia has provided nuclear expertise, notably for the Bushehr nuclear power plant, and reportedly sought assurances from Israel not to attack it due to the presence of Russian experts.

Israel's Ambiguous Deterrence and Existential Threat

Israel maintains a policy of nuclear ambiguity, neither confirming nor denying its nuclear program, though it is widely understood to possess a reactor in Dimona. This ambiguity allows it to maintain a "credible threat without triggering any real international scrutiny." Evidence of its nuclear capabilities includes the case of Mordechai Vanunu, a whistleblower who leaked details and photos of the program in the late 1980s and was subsequently imprisoned for 18 years. Former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has also implied Israel's nuclear program, and some Israeli ministers have controversially called to "nuke Gaza."

For Israel, Iran's nuclear program is an "existential concern," a narrative consistently pushed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu since the 1990s, who has repeatedly warned of Iran being close to developing a nuclear bomb, comparing it to "a nuclear armed al-Qaeda." Netanyahu has used this threat to rally public support, especially during domestic crises. Israel is not a signatory to the NPT and has not ratified the CTBT. It has long opposed the JCPOA, arguing it "paves Iran's path to the bomb" by strengthening its economy and funding its proxies, demanding instead that Iran dismantle all nuclear infrastructure.

The Israeli media framed the June 2025 attack on Iran as a "necessary step" and a "massive military success," with discussions of regime change. Public opinion polls showed significant support (82%) for the attack. This aligns with the Begin Doctrine, where Israel carries out pre-emptive strikes against perceived nuclear threats, exemplified by the 1981 attack on Iraq's nuclear facility and the 2007 strike on Syria's alleged reactor.

Saudi Arabia's Strategic Ambitions and Regional Shifts

Saudi Arabia, another regional heavyweight, initially pursued rapprochement with Israel (Abraham Accords) before October 2023, viewing Iran as a common adversary. However, the Gaza war dramatically shifted regional dynamics, increasing anti-Israel sentiment and leading Saudi Arabia to improve ties with Iran. A March 2023 rapprochement deal gained momentum in 2024, as Israel's actions in Gaza and Lebanon weakened Iran's "Axis of Resistance" (e.g., fall of Assad regime, weakened Hezbollah), positioning Saudi Arabia as a beneficiary of this power shift and closer to its long-term goal of regional hegemony.

Saudi Arabia claims its interest in nuclear technology is for energy production, part of its Vision 2030 program for economic diversification and increasing renewable energy. This "green sustainability language" has drawn accusations of "greenwashing" given its continued reliance on fossil fuel revenues. However, its uranium enrichment plans are also driven by rivalry with Iran, with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman stating Saudi Arabia would develop nuclear weapons if Iran did ("If they get one, we have to get one"). While the leadership makes these statements to foreign media, domestic and pan-Arab Saudi media largely avoid discussing military nuclear programs, as it clashes with the narrative of Saudi Arabia as a "peace broker" and "proponent of de-escalation."

The US is Saudi Arabia's preferred partner for a civilian nuclear program, but imposes the "gold standard" condition of no domestic uranium enrichment. Saudi Arabia strategically leverages cooperation with China and Russia, who offer less stringent restrictions, to gain influence with the US.

Turkey's Dual Stance and Emerging Power

Turkey, a regional heavyweight and self-proclaimed peace broker, is a signatory to both the NPT (1979) and the CTBT (2000), prohibiting it from developing nuclear weapons. However, it hosts approximately 50 Cold War-era B61 gravity bombs at the US Incirlik airbase, an "open secret." The presence of these warheads has been a recurring point of contention in US-Turkey relations, especially when ties are strained or when Turkey strengthens relations with Russia (e.g., purchasing the S400 missile system).

The Gaza war further fueled public sentiment, with many pro-Palestinian voices arguing that hosting the airbase makes Turkey complicit. Pro-government voices argue that Turkey lacks access to these warheads and should independently develop its own nuclear weapons. A recent public survey showed an "overwhelming majority" supporting Turkey owning nuclear weapons, fearing that if Israel attacked Iran, it could similarly attack Turkey. This alarm is also linked to Turkey's regional conflicts, particularly in Syria, where it accuses Israel of stoking tensions.

President Erdogan has previously stated it is "unacceptable that other countries owned nuclear warhead missiles, but that Turkey could not own any," while also criticizing nuclear powers for disparity and advocating non-proliferation. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan criticized the NPT for acknowledging the military superiority of nuclear-armed states. Turkey is building its first nuclear power plant with Russia's Rosatom, claiming it's solely for energy diversification and independence, without uranium enrichment. However, its close ties with nuclear-armed Pakistan and uranium-rich Kazakhstan have led to speculation about a potential nuclear weapons program.

Conclusion: The Shifting Sands of Nuclear Ambiguity

The episode concludes with the activation of the snapback mechanism by the E3 (UK, Germany, France) in late August, reimposing UN sanctions on Iran due to its non-compliance. Iran domestically downplayed the economic impact, while internationally attempting to stall the return of sanctions, notably through a September Cairo agreement with the IAEA that allowed for a cooperation framework but not immediate inspection of "missing" highly enriched nuclear materials. Simultaneously, Moscow and Tehran signed a $25 billion deal to build four nuclear power plants in southern Iran.

Iranian media reflects a policy of "nuclear ambiguity." With the West establishing a "hard line," Iran faces a choice: capitulate and step back from a core aspect of its nuclear policy, or continue a hardline approach. The "total absence of inspectors" means Iran has a "free hand" with its nuclear material, effectively "Iran going dark," further complicating the global nuclear order. The narratives and actions of these Middle Eastern powers demonstrate a complex interplay of energy needs, national prestige, regional rivalries, and existential fears, all against the backdrop of a transformed global security landscape.