All of Africa's coup leaders during the past five years are still in power • FRANCE 24 English

Key Concepts

• Coup Wave: A period characterized by a significant increase in successful and attempted military coups in a region or continent.
• Impunity: Exemption from punishment or freedom from the injurious consequences of an action.
• ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States): A regional bloc of West African nations.
• African Union (AU): A continental union consisting of 55 member states located on the continent of Africa.
• Alliance of Sahelian States (AES): A security and defense pact formed by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger after their withdrawal from ECOWAS.
• Constitutional Coup: A coup that occurs within the existing constitutional framework, often involving a transfer of power that is not through regular elections.
• Jihadist Violence: Violence perpetrated by groups adhering to a radical interpretation of Islam.
• Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking: Illicit activities carried out by organized groups.
• Global Power Competition: The rivalry between major global powers for influence and dominance.

Guinea-Bissau and the Regional Coup Trend

Nina Willan, Head of the Africa Program at the Egmont Institute, discusses the recent coup in Guinea-Bissau and its implications within a broader regional context. She expresses skepticism regarding the stated intention of the new de facto leader, General Horten Tam, to remain in power for only one year, suggesting that a peaceful transition within that timeframe is unlikely.

The Escalating Coup Wave in Africa

Willan highlights a significant trend of military coups across the African continent, which began in 2020. Since then, there have been 17 coup attempts, with 10 proving successful. This statistic, she notes, provides a strong incentive for military leaders to initiate coups. Furthermore, all leaders who have seized power through coups in the past five years remain in control, with announced transitions often being extended or coup leaders winning subsequent elections. This indicates a pattern of leaders taking power with the intention of staying.

Regional Bodies' Diminished Clout

The effectiveness of regional bodies like the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS in addressing these coups is questioned. Willan states that both organizations have demonstrated very little leverage over coup leaders, particularly since the 2020 coup wave.

• ECOWAS's Failed Intervention Threat: In Niger in 2023, ECOWAS threatened military intervention if coup leaders did not relinquish power. This threat was not carried out and was perceived as a bluff by the coup leaders, who subsequently threatened a regional war against ECOWAS members.
• Withdrawal from ECOWAS: Following ECOWAS's threat, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger declared their withdrawal from the organization. They have since formed the Alliance of Sahelian States (AES) in September 2023, a move seen as a direct reaction to ECOWAS's intervention threat.
• ECOWAS's Loss of Credibility: The AES's formation has divided ECOWAS, leading the bloc to retract its intervention threat and sanctions against Nigerian coup leaders. ECOWAS has also urged the three exiting states to return, acknowledging the ineffectiveness of their previous actions. Willan asserts that ECOWAS has lost considerable power and credibility, with five of its 15 member states having experienced successful coups since 2020 without ECOWAS restoring constitutional order in any of them.
• AU's Inconsistent Response: The AU has consistently condemned coups, with the notable exception of the "constitutional coup" in Chad in April 2021, where Idris Déby's son took power unconstitutionally after his father's death on the battlefield. This inconsistency has drawn criticism.

The Vacuum and its Fillers

Willan addresses the concern that a power vacuum created by coups might be filled by extremist groups, mercenaries, or foreign powers. She argues that such vacuums are rarely left unfilled, with various actors quickly stepping in.

• Justifications for Coups: Coup leaders often cite corruption by incumbent leaders as a primary justification for their actions. While Sahelian coup leaders also mention combating jihadism, in Guinea-Bissau, the stated problem is organized crime and drug trafficking rather than terrorism.
• Failure to Combat Jihadism: In the Sahelian countries, coup leaders have not fulfilled their promises to be more effective in combating jihadist violence. Instead, there has been an increase in Islamist violence, transforming the Sahel into the region most affected by terrorist violence globally, a stark contrast to its status in 2012.

Deeper Structural Reasons for the Coup Trend

Willan identifies several broader structural reasons behind the current wave of coups:

1. History of Coups: Countries with a prior history of coups are more susceptible to further attempts. Guinea-Bissau, with 11 to 17 coup attempts since its independence in 1974, exemplifies this, indicating the military's close proximity to power. The current coup is the fifth successful one since 1974, perpetuating a vicious cycle. Burkina Faso, with 11 successful coups, also demonstrates this pattern.
2. Central Role of the Military: In many of these states, the military plays a central role, often holding political positions and being perceived as the entity capable of resolving crises, including combating jihadist violence. They are seen as saviors, a perception that has been challenged by the outcomes following their assumption of power.
3. Global Power Competition: The current global power competition creates opportunities for new partners who are less concerned with enforcing democratic norms and more willing to collaborate with coup leaders. Western states are also re-evaluating their positions in this competitive landscape. In the Sahelian states, coup leaders have expelled Western and multilateral actors and turned to Russia for support, demonstrating an incentive for coup leaders to switch partners if necessary.

While acknowledging that each coup has unique national reasons, Willan concludes that these three structural factors provide a strong explanation for the recent widespread coup trend.